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THE URBANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 




In an era of increased partisan gridlock among nation-states, ongoing 
democratic deficits in the international policymaking process, plummeting 
levels of trust in national leaders, and the failure of federal governments to 
solve our most pressing global problems,
1
attention is shifting to a different 
set of actors: cities.
2
Cities are not only more attuned to the needs of their 
electorate, more trusted than their national counterparts, more adept at get-
ting things done, and less partisan when it comes to working across aisles 
and oceans,
3
but they are also more ambitious in pushing forward bold, hu-
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1. See THOMAS HALE, DAVID HELD, & KEVIN YOUNG, GRIDLOCK: WHY GLOBAL 
COOPERATION IS FAILING WHEN WE NEED IT MOST (2013) (arguing that our tools for global 
policymaking, primarily state-to-state negotiations over treaties and international institutions, 
have broken down); Dan Koon-Hong Chan, City Diplomacy and “Glocal” Governance: Revi-
talizing Cosmopolitan Democracy, 29 EURO. J. SOC. SCI. RES. 134, 135 (2016) (discussing 
how international policymaking suffers from democratic deficits). 
2. Many pundits, scholars, and even former diplomats are starting to make this argu-
ment. See, e.g., GERALD FRUG, RICHARD FORD, & DAVID BARRON, LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 278 (6th ed. 2010); Nina Hachigian, Cities Will Determine the 
Future of Diplomacy, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 16, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/16/
cities-will-determine-the-future-of-diplomacy; Chrystie Swiney & Sheila Foster, Cities are 
Rising in Influence and Power on the Global Stage, CITYLAB (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://www.citylab.com/perspective/2019/04/city-leadership-international-policy-mayors-
u20-uclg-c40/587089; Robert Muggah et al., Cities, Not Nation States, Will Determine Our 
Future Survival. Here’s Why, WORLD ECON. F. (June 2, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2017/06/as-nation-states-falter-cities-are-stepping-up. 
3. Richard Florida, Are Local Politics as Polarized as National? Depends on the Is-
sue, CITYLAB (Apr. 24, 2019) https://www.citylab.com/life/2019/04/polarization-cities-
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manity-saving agendas. As national governments seem increasingly unable 
or unwilling to advance progressive policies at the international level, and as 
our shared global challenges grow more and more urgent––climate change, 
deepening inequality, the global migration crisis, shortages of affordable 
housing, infectious pandemics, democratic decay, and rising extremism––
cities
4
are rising up and moving ahead with or without their national coun-
terparts.
5
In so doing, cities are gaining influence and assertiveness not only 
at the national level, but within international politics as well, and this reality 
is decisively shifting our traditional understandings of both international law 
and global politics.
6
Cities are entirely absent from the increasingly anachronistic interna-
tional political and legal framework forged after World War II.
7
Conse-
quently, they have been forced to work within a system that largely denies 
their independent existence, or, more precisely, views them as subordinate 
appendages of their nation-states. States,
8
not cities, are expected to repre-
sent their citizens and all sub-national entities at the international level: Na-
tional governments, not local ones, send representatives to staff the govern-
ing bodies comprising the United Nations (“UN”) and other international 
organizations, and states, not cities, are tasked with drafting, codifying, and 
enforcing international treaties and agreements on behalf of their sub-
national entities.
9
Formally and institutionally, cities have no voice, no offi-
education-labor-public-opinion-taxes/587746 (discussing a recent study that found that, in the 
United States, trust in national government is around 17%, while trust in local institutions is 
over 70%).
4. In this article, I use the word “city” to mean “local governments,” and I use the two 
terms interchangeably. But cities are of course so much more than just their local govern-
ments. They are composed of people, civil society organizations, private corporations, 
schools, and government officials, among others. 
5. Barbara Oomen & Moritz Baumgärtel, Frontier Cities: The Rise of Local Authori-
ties as an Opportunity for International Human Rights Law, 29 EURO. J. INT’L L. 607, 608 
(2018) (arguing that local actors increasingly claim and obtain a key role in the realization of 
international law). 
6. This phenomenon (cities rising up to act as independent actors) is very much hap-
pening at the national level as well: Cities are rising up within national politics to assert their 
own positions and opinions, and they are finding ways to enact their own progressive policies 
even in the face of national opposition. But the focus of this paper will be on cities’ role in the 
international sphere only, specifically through the lens of international relations and interna-
tional law. I hope to write about the rising role of cities at the national level in a future publi-
cation. 
7. Cities are not at all absent or missing from national laws (indeed these laws typical-
ly specify what roles and rights they have), but they are entirely missing from formal public 
international law. (Private international law, in contrast, does take cities more seriously. This 
article, however, focuses only on public international law.)
8. Use of the word “state” in this article refers to nation-states; it does not refer to a 
federal state in a federated system, such as the United States, unless so designated (as by “U.S. 
state”). 
9. The United Nations (“UN”) Charter, which was signed on June 26, 1945, outlines 
the basic rules that shape the current international political and legal framework. A cursory 
review of its nineteen chapters reveals how myopically focused this framework is on nation-
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cial seat or platform––indeed, no meaningful existence––within the current 
international policymaking system.
Yet, despite the many institutional, legal, and political barriers that exist 
to prevent cities from entering the international political arena, they are nev-
ertheless finding ways to do so, and with increasing success. More specifi-
cally, cities are discovering ways to act as autonomous, independent actors 
in their own right––separate and independent of their federal counterparts
10
–
–in their efforts to influence and shape international agendas. This article 
explores the variety of creative and resourceful strategies that they have 
honed to do so, largely over the past two decades. These include: (1) coa-
lescing together to form large networks, which engage in city or “glocal” 
diplomacy;
11
(2) allying with well-connected and well-resourced interna-
tional organizations;
12
(3) gaining inclusion in UN multilateral agendas;
13
(4) mirroring state-based coalitions and their high-profile events;
14
(5) har-
states. Indeed, cities are not mentioned a single time, while the words “nation” and “state”
appear over forty times. See Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International 
Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter U.N. Char-
ter and ICJ Statute].
10. Concurrently, some cities are working alongside their federal counterparts––
through formal offices or collaborations created by the national government––to participate in 
policy at the international level. For example, in the United States, from 2010 to 2013 the 
Obama administration created a special representative for Global Intergovernmental Affairs, 
which was charged with building strategic peer-to-peer relationships between the U.S. De-
partment of State, U.S. state and local officials, and their foreign counterparts. See Reta Jo 
Lewis, Staff Profile, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES [THE GERMAN 
MARSHALL FUND], http://www.gmfus.org/profiles/reta-jo-lewis-esq (last visited Nov. 24, 
2019). There is currently a bipartisan bill under consideration, the City and State Diplomacy 
Act (H.R. 3571, 116th Cong. (2019)), which would establish a permanent Office of Subna-
tional Diplomacy within the Department of State to encourage state- and city-level interna-
tional diplomacy. The bill remains under review and has not yet become law. See Reta Jo 
Lewis, A New Act to Revitalize U.S. Diplomacy from the Ground Up, THE GERMAN 
MARSHALL FUND (July 22, 2019), www.gmfus.org/blog/2019/07/22/new-act-revitalize-us-
diplomacy-ground.
11. “Glocal” diplomacy, as used in this article and as further described and defined be-
low, is the unmediated diplomatic action of local governments at the international level. The 
term was popularized by sociologist Roland Robertson in the 1990s to explain how global 
social processes are selectively redefined and adapted to suit local cultural exigencies. Marga-
ret Rouse, Glocalization Definition, TECHTARGET, https://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/
glocalization (last visited Jan. 12, 2020). 
12. Ileana M. Porras, The City and International Law: In Pursuit of Sustainable Devel-
opment, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 537, 552–63 (2009). 
13. Examples include: The New Urban Agenda; the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable De-
velopment (see Goal 11 specifically); the Paris Climate Agreement; the Addis Ababa Action 
Agenda; the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction; and the UN Conference on the 
Environment and Development. Many of these examples are discussed infra in Part III.C.
14. One example includes the U20, or the Urban 20, which seeks to coordinate joint 
policy positions between the mayors of the main cities of the G20 and those of other global 
urban centers in order to inform and enrich the discussions had by national leaders during 
their G20 Summits. It meets on the sidelines of G20 events. See UNITED CITIES AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS [UCLG], U20: 25 Cities Commit to Work with the G20 in Response to Major 
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nessing the language of international law (especially international human 
rights and environmental law) to advance agendas at odds with their nation-
al counterparts;
15
and (6) adopting resolutions, declarations, and voluntarily 
self-policed commitments––what I refer to as global law––that look strik-
ingly similar to state-made international law.
16
Using these six strategies, 
cities are piercing the states-only veil of international politics in ways argu-
ably not seen in the post-Westphalian era.
17
To be sure, cities are not the only “new” non-state actors to get involved 
in the state-centric world of international politics.
18
By jumping into the in-
ternational political fray, cities are joining a chorus of other non-state actors, 
including civil society organizations, private corporations, regional coali-
tions, special interest groups, and a ream of others in what has become an 
increasingly diffuse international political arena.
19
However, unlike most of 
these other non-state actors, cities carry a unique status: They are still gov-
ernmental.
Global Challenges, https://www.uclg.org/en/media/news/25-cities-commit-work-g20-
response-major-global-challenges (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
15. See generally GLOBAL URBAN JUSTICE: THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CITIES 275 
(Barbara Oomen, Martha Davis, & Michele Grigolo eds., 2016). 
16. Each of these will be discussed below. I chose the term “global law” to serve as a 
juxtaposition to Gerald Frug and David Barron’s term international local law, which is further 
discussed and detailed in the sections below. See Gerald Frug & David Barron, International 
Local Government Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1, 59 (2006).
17. Before the Westphalian era, cities played a powerful role at the international level. 
Well-documented examples of politically autonomous cities include ancient Greek city-states, 





centuries. The Bible is also replete with examples of powerful cities in 
ancient and early CE times: Jericho, Ur, Babylon, Damascus, Jerusalem, etc. But from the 
Peace of Westaphalia in 1648 onwards, the nation-state became the center of international 
politics, law and relations. See generally INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: CONCEPTS, THEORIES 
AND ISSUES (Rumki Basu ed., 2012); PAUL D’ANIERI, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: POWER 
AND PURPOSE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS (4th ed. 2016); KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND
WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (reprt. 2001) (1954). 
18. I put “new” in quotes because there is a long history of non-state actors attempting 
to penetrate and shape the international legal and political sphere. For example, humanitarian 
activists and organizations, such as the Red Cross (which is 137 years old), have actively 
shaped international humanitarian law and the laws of war for hundreds of years. RED CROSS,
A Brief History of the Red Cross, https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/
National/history-full-history.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
19. Many political scientists and legal scholars talk about, and research, the fragmented 
nature of global politics in the twenty-first century. Anne-Marie Slaughter was one of the first 
to make a persuasive and formidable argument about this. Though she did not specifically 
feature or focus on cities––she focused instead on transnational networks––she is nevertheless 
one of the leading scholars to have pointed out the diffusing nature of global power and poli-
tics. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Or-
der, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 284 (2004).
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Moreover, at least for those city governments operating within one of 
the world’s 115 electoral democracies,
20
they are representative, rather than 
issue-, interest-, or profit-driven.
21
Cities are where human populations are 
converging; over half of all people live in urban centers today, a number 
that will rise to two-thirds by 2050.
22
Roughly every two weeks, a popula-
tion the size of Chicago joins the world’s urban population, which already 
includes over 500 cities worldwide with populations of more than one mil-
lion residents.
23
Thus, cities, unlike many of the other non-state actors in-
volved in global politics, have a uniquely compelling argument regarding 
their legitimacy and right to be involved in shaping global agendas: They 
represent the interests of actual people––a lot of actual people, indeed most 
of the world’s people––not just elite or special interest-driven missions, 
however noble those missions might be.
24
As legal scholars Barbara Oomen 
and Moritz Baumgärtel put it, cities represent a “transnational force beyond 
the top down world of international negotiations or the bottom-up advocacy 
of civil society groups.”
25
They are uniquely placed and have a uniquely 
strong claim on the legitimacy of their participation in the hyper-
competitive world of global policy making and shaping.
This article examines the various ways in which cities are “leapfrog-
ging” over their nation-states to act as autonomous actors in their own right 
at the international level, as well as the implications of this newfound de-
velopment on both international law (“IL”) and international relations 
20. According to Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World Report, which 
measures the state of freedom in the world by quantifying the level of civil and political rights 
in every country, there are currently 115 electoral democracies in the world. See FREEDOM 
HOUSE, List of Electoral Democracies (from the Freedom in the World 2020 Report), 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world (last visited Apr. 11, 2020). This number var-
ies from year to year and is slightly lower than the number of electoral democracies from pre-
vious years; for example, there were the 123 countries designated as electoral democracies in 
Freedom House’s 2017 report, and 116 in its 2019 report. Even with the variance, it appears 
that the percentage of the world’s governments that are electoral democracies is at or above 
60%.
21. See BENJAMIN BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: DYSFUNCTIONAL 
NATIONS, RISING CITIES 336–61 (2013).
22. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Re-
vision, at 11, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/420 (2019). These numbers are shocking when con-
sidering that in 1950, only 30% of the world’s population was urban. Id.
23. Ivo Daalder, Why Cities Need Their Own Foreign Policies, POLITICO (June 6, 
2017). 
24. HABITAT III: U.N. CONF. ON HOUSING AND SUSTAINABLE URB. DEV. [hereinafter 
HABITAT III], Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments,
http://habitat3.org/engagement/global-taskforce-of-local-and-regional-governments (last visit-
ed Jan. 12, 2020). The Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments is very active at 
the UN level. It routinely argues that “[l]ocal governments have unique legitimacy, as a dem-
ocratically elected sphere of the state, to bring together and balance all sectors and interests in 
their communities.” Id. 
25. Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5, at 610.
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(“IR”).
26
To understand why cities are adopting particular tools and strate-
gies, one must first comprehend their formal place within the existing inter-
national and political legal framework, as well as the factors driving cities to 
assert themselves at the international level in the first place. As such, Part II 
examines the virtual absence of cities from the existing international legal 
framework, which was put in place in the 1940s, but whose conceptual ori-
gins date back to the mid-seventeenth century. This section outlines the tra-
ditional black letter law pertaining to cities and their involvement in global 
politics and law and examines a niche body of scholarship known as “inter-
national local government law,” that until now has largely framed the schol-
arly discussion on cities’ relationship to IL. This literature, which was 
spearheaded by Professors Yishai Blank, David Barron, and Gerald Frug in 
2006,
27
is both outdated and subject to (long-overdue) criticism.
Part III then examines the various tools and strategies being used by cit-
ies and their networks to penetrate the state-centric international system and 
to become influential and independent international actors in their own 
right. As previously stated, these strategies include: forming into networks, 
allying with international organizations, locating seats on UN decision-
making bodies and inclusion in multilateral agendas, mirroring state-based 
coalitions and high-profile events, harnessing the language of international 
law, and adopting what I refer to as global law in order to hold each other to 
account. Global law is primarily composed of voluntary, self-enforced 
commitments that are drafted, implemented, and enforced by global, non-
state actors––notably including cities––but that are arguably no less “real” 
than much of what qualifies as state-made international law.
Particular attention will be devoted to international city networks, argu-
ably the most robust and influential of these strategies. The existing scholar-
ship on city networks, much of which is spearheaded by IR scholar Michele 
Acuto but expounded on by others, will be reviewed and critiqued.
28
While 
this literature offers many insights and useful empirical data, it almost en-
tirely ignores cities’ formal powerlessness under IL and, in general, lacks in 
legal analysis, which is crucial for fully understanding the role of cities at 
the international level.
Part IV of this paper advances a new way of conceptualizing the current 
status of cities within international politics and under IL by drawing on two 
concepts in particular: “soft power,” which comes from IR theory, and “soft 
law,” which is discussed primarily in international legal scholarship. By ap-
plying these two concepts to cities––and by building upon the insights 
gleaned from the relevant bodies of literature associated with cities and city 
26. See Yishai Blank, The City and the World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 875, 886 
(2006) (referring to cities “leapfrogging” over their federal governments to act of their own 
accord).
27. Id.; FRUG, FORD, & BARRON, supra note 2.
28. See generally Octavi de la Varga Mas, Entangled: A Reflection on the Current 
State of the Ecosystem of Local Government Networks, in RETHINKING THE ECOSYSTEM OF 
INTERNATIONAL CITY NETWORKS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 85, 85 (2019).
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diplomacy, I tentatively offer a new framework and a new vocabulary for 
understanding cities’ radically changing role in global politics, which I refer 
to as “the Urbanization of Global Relations.”
Finally, Part V discusses predicted trends in urban-global, or “glocal,” 
politics and what they say about our changing international legal and politi-
cal world order (what I would simply refer to as the “global” world order). 
The term “international” no longer seems appropriate to describe a sphere 
where the state is now only one of a multitude of influential actors. The arti-
cle concludes with a call for help advancing and refining the research agen-
da proposed herein and with suggestions for areas ripe for further explora-
tion at the intersection of IL, IR, and urban studies. Only by reaching across 
our ivory towers and siloed departments, cross-pollinating our ideas, and 
working collaboratively together can we hope to fully grasp the complex 
political landscape that now defines global governance.
II.  Cities and International Law
A. Black Letter International Law on Cities
Traditional black letter international law, which is designed to deal with 
state behavior with very few exceptions,
29
is effectively blind to the exist-
ence of cities. Indeed, reference to “cities” is entirely absent from the tradi-
tional sources of IL:
30
Cities cannot form treaties
31
or contribute to the for-
mation of customary IL,
32
they cannot obtain legal standing in international 
courts or tribunals,
33
and they are not mentioned a single time anywhere in 
the UN Charter, a foundational international legal framework that mentions 
“state” and “nation” over forty times.
34
29. The exceptions primarily include international human rights law and international 
criminal law, both of which deal with the actions or treatment of individuals. See Chan, supra
note 1, at 135. 
30. See U.N. Charter and ICJ Statute, supra note 9, art. 38(1) (defining traditional 
sources of international law as treaties, custom, general principles of law, the decisions of 
lower courts, and scholarly writings). 
31. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (defining a treaty as an “international agreement concluded between 
States”).
32. See generally Daniel Bodansky, The Concept of Customary International Law, 16
MICH. J. INT’L L. 667, 670 (1995) (stating that customary international law is determined by 
examining state practice and opinio juris). 
33. Though cities are often party to domestic lawsuits and though they may have re-
course in international matters through private international law, the mandates of the largest 
international public law tribunals give standing only to states. See, e.g., U.N. Charter and ICJ 
Statute, supra note 9, art. 34(1) (“Only states may be parties in cases before the court.”); 
Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct., 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, arts. 11–13 (referring 
only to jurisdiction over State Parties).
34. See U.N. Charter and ICJ Statute, supra note 9. Note that the Preamble to the UN 
Charter does mention that the representative governments drafting the Charter met in the 
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Under IL, cities entirely lack legal personality, which means they do not 
have rights, duties, or recognition under the law.
35
Moreover, given that cit-
ies are not subjects of IL, they cannot be held liable for international legal 
violations,
36
nor can they be full, independent members of state-based inter-
national organizations, including the UN (or any of its primary organs), 
whose exclusive membership includes only “peace loving states.”37
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the key international 
instrument governing the creation and enforcement of international treaties 
(the primary source of IL), explicitly defines treaties as international agree-
ments formed between states.38 The Convention makes no mention whatso-
ever of any other jurisdiction bearing this critical law-making authority; it 
applies to states (and organizations composed of states) alone.
39
Likewise, a 
leading IL textbook spans nearly 1700 pages of detailed text, yet there is not 
a single section or sub-section on cities or local governments,
40
an omission 
also reflected in the syllabi for IL courses found in a non-exhaustive, but ex-
tensive, online search.
41
This myopic fixation on states is built into the core 
“City” of San Francisco. This is not a substantive inclusion of the word “city,” so I did not 
count it. Id. pmbl.
35. RICHARD PUGH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 248 (4th 
ed. 2001); Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 892.
36. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
207(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“A state is responsible for any violation of its obligations un-
der international law resulting from action or inaction by . . . (b) the government or authorities 
of any political subdivision of the state.”); G.A. Res 56/83, ¶ 4(1) Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, (Jan. 28, 2002), (“The conduct of any State organ shall be con-
sidered an act of that State international law . . . whatever its character as an organ of the cen-
tral government or of a territorial unit of the State.”).
37. U.N. Charter and ICJ Statute, supra note 8, art. 4(1); see also UNITED NATIONS, 
About UN Membership, http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/about-un-membership/
index.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2020) (describing how states can be admitted to member-
ship); UNITED NATIONS, About Permanent Observers, https://www.un.org/en/sections/
member-states/about-permanent-observers/index.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2020) (noting that 
both “non-member states” such as the Holy See and Palestine, and regional and international 
civil society organizations can serve as observers at the UN General Assembly and before one
or more specialized UN agency); UNITED NATIONS, Permanent Observers: Intergovernmental 
and Other Organizations, https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/intergovernmental-
and-other-organizations/index.html (listing organizations invited to attend UN General As-
sembly meetings).
38. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 31, art. 2(1)(a).
39. Id. art. 1 (“The present Convention applies to treaties between States.”); see also id.
art. 7 (affirming that representatives of states belonging to international organizations can also 
conclude treaties). This is an application of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon. By 
including organizations of states, convention participants showed they considered (or had the 
opportunity to consider) other viable non-state actors and rejected them. 
40. PUGH ET AL., supra note 35. Note that while there is a lengthy section on “munici-
pal law,” “municipal” in the international law context refers to domestic, national-level law, 
not local or city-level law. Id.
41. Needless to say, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of international law courses 
nation-wide and globally, each of which is accompanied by a syllabus. I reviewed roughly 
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vocabulary associated with the international political and legal world order–
–the United Nations (the successor to the League of Nations), international 
law, international organizations, international relations, international di-
plomacy––making it difficult to even talk about global politics without em-
ploying the word “nation.”
The foundational principle of IL, which can be traced back over 300 
years, is built on the long-standing idea that nation-states are the highest and 
exclusive authority, the Leviathan, over their territories.
42
With rare excep-
tion, IL treats states as the makers and shapers of its content and as the gate-
keepers of implementation and enforcement.
43
As political scientist James 
Rosenau and others have argued, the state centrism of IR and IL is a “con-
ceptual jail” that prevents us from noticing the rise of other non-state actors 
in international affairs
44
and the blurring of the historical lines between the 
local and the global, the domestic and the foreign.
45
Nation-states are understandably protective of their pinnacle position in 
the international legal and political pecking order. While cities can and do 
violate international law, when they do, the cities’ states are held responsi-
ble for their violations, not the cities themselves. By passing legislation that 
codifies international legal norms into domestic law, states can hold their 
cities directly responsible for violations domestically, but the connection be-
tween IL and cities is never direct. At least formally, this connection is al-
ways meditated by the state.
B. Revisiting International Local Government Law
Scholars of local government law began noticing a direct connection, or 
what they thought was a direct connection, between the law of local govern-
ance and IL in the earlier part of this century. In particular, a series of arti-
cles published in 2006 by three scholars of local government law began de-
tailing the evolving relationship between these two previously unconnected 
fields.
46
Blank broke new ground when he argued that cities had become “ob-
jects of global, international, and transnational regulation,” something that 
fifty syllabi that I located through a simple online search. This is admittedly an anecdotal ap-
proach, but it is nevertheless reflective, in my opinion, of the lack of focus on cities in interna-
tional law courses. 
42. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A 
COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL (1886).
43. Implementation and enforcement tasks are arguably shifting to allow for other ac-
tors to be involved. See generally Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5, at 626. 
44. See Chan, supra note 1, at 138 (citing JAMES ROSENAU, ALONG THE DOMESTIC-
FOREIGN FRONTIER: EXPLORING GOVERNANCE IN A TURBULENT WORLD 15–17 (1997)).
45. See JAMES ROSENAU, DISTANT PROXIMITIES: DYNAMICS BEYOND 
GLOBALIZATION 410 (2003) (“What is domestic is also foreign and what is foreign is also 
domestic.”). 
46. See generally Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26; Frug & Barron, supra 
note 16. 
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had, until then, received “virtually no discussion.”
47
Though conceding that 
cities still fall “short of obtaining the status of full international legal enti-
ties,” Blank nevertheless argued that cities have become relevant to the 
making, shaping, and enforcing of international law.
48
Because of this, he 
asserted, cities are moving ever closer to being actual “bearers” and “ob-
jects” of international rights, duties, and powers.
49
Blank made two other 
bold claims. First, that cities have become enforcers of international norms 
and standards, often referred to as “soft law” (though Blank never used this 
term).
50
Second, that in so doing, cities have gained influence as political 
actors, in their own right, on the world political stage (what I argue is “soft 
power,” though again, Blank never used this term).
51
These developments 
are part of a new “emerging global legal order,” Blank claimed; like the new 
political world order, he argued that it has become more fragmented and 
dispersed and involves a multitude of new non-state actors that now partici-
pate alongside states in global governance.
52
According to Blank, cities are 
“the most prominent” among these new actors and in the “reconfiguration of 
the global order.”
53
The nation-state no longer stands as the unitary and im-
penetrable billiard ball it once was.
54
It is now accompanied, and at times 
challenged, by a multitude of other actors, notably including increasingly 
vocal, organized, and ambitious local governments.
55
Traditionally, most political––and virtually all legal––theories have fo-
cused primarily on two dyadic relationships: the global-national relationship 
and the national-local one. To these two dyads, Professor Blank usefully 
added a third: the global-local relationship.
56
According to Blank, this new 
dyad has been forged largely because local governments have learned to use 
IL to their advantage, to “leapfrog” over their state governments and to have 
a direct and autonomous connection with international organizations and 
agendas.
57
Blank’s insight that there could be a direct connection between 
the local and the global, a connection unmediated by the state, was novel at 
47. Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 899–90. 
48. Yishai Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 263, 
266 (2006).
49. Id. at 266. 
50. Id. at 268.
51. Id. at 281 (claiming that “[l]ocalities are no longer mere bureaucratic subdivisions 
of states”. . . but instead are “increasingly influential” in “the global legal order”). 
52. See Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 924. 
53. Id. at 886. 
54. ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS 19–20 (1962).
55. Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 930. 
56. Id. at 889. Collectively, he refers to these three dyads as the “novel trinity.” Id.
57. Id. According to Blank, “local governments can now use international law in their 
struggle against their states and other localities, and the world faces two distinct entities––the 
state and localities––and it no longer addresses them as if they were the same legal creature.”
Id.
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the time he wrote, and it significantly advanced our understanding of cities’ 
evolving status in international affairs.
Yet, while Blank’s claims were bold, provocative, and insightful, they 
were short on empirical support and––even in 2006––were quickly becom-
ing outdated. For example, he cited three domestic court cases as support for 
his claim that local governments are becoming objects of international law: 
Odlocba, Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States, and Crosby v. Na-
tional Foreign Trade Council.58 Yet, two of the three cases end with the 
court reaching the opposite conclusion, and the third case, on a fuller read-
ing, is only very weakly supportive of his claim: The Slovenian Supreme 
Court in Odlocba held that the Slovenian Constitution prohibits local gov-
ernance units from exceeding the size necessary for the normal functioning 
of local government. (A loss for the local government.) In Metalclad, an 
ICSID tribunal upheld a decision by a NAFTA tribunal that awarded Meta-
clad, a U.S. corporation, compensation for the losses it suffered due to the 
refusal of the local Mexican authorities to let it operate a hazardous waste 
facility within the jurisdiction. (Another loss for the local government.) And 
in Crosby, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Massachusetts government 
procurement act which prohibited state entities from doing business with 
companies that had business ties with Burma was invalid, as this trans-
gressed into the federal government’s sphere. (Yet another loss for a sub-
national government, this time the state.) Indeed, in all three cases the fed-
eral, not the local, government was ultimately held responsible for the al-
leged international violation, because the cities’ obligations under IL were 
considered derivative of the state’s, just as expected under classic black let-
ter IL.
59
Additionally, Blank repeatedly distilled cities’ IL obligations from non-
binding policy agendas, which cannot and do not constitute binding interna-
tional law. For example, some of the environmental agreements that are cit-
ed, such as Agenda 21 (which “recommends” the strengthening of environ-
mental mechanisms at “the lowest appropriate level”), are not treaties or 
58. Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, 920–24 n.153 (citing Odlocba st. U-
I-90/94, Uradni list Republike Slovenije, st. 29/94, http://www.sigov.si/us/eus-decs.html 
(Slovn.)), 155 (citing Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1 (2001)), and 163 (citing Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 
363 (2000)).
59. For example, Blank claimed that local governments are “initiating and forming”
transnational law through agreements with “localities across borders,” but only, as he explicit-
ly acknowledged, “when authorized by their states.” Blank, The City and the World, supra
note 26, at 906 (emphasis added). In another example, Blank concluded that the Slovenian 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Odlocba restricting localities from exceeding the size necessary 
for their normal functioning based on “the European concept of local government” demon-
strates “the fact that global governance projects increasingly develop a comprehensive view of 
localities, which they previously lacked.” Id. at 920. But, in reality, this is an example of a 
branch of the national government (the judiciary) imposing its will on localities, not of inter-
national law. 
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international legal instruments at all, but only policy agendas.
60
Likewise, 
while Blank conceded that the voluntary private agreements that localities 
make with the World Bank in exchange for loans and financial assistance 
“do not count as international law,” he still used them as examples of the 
growing relevance of cities to international law.
61
Moreover, some of his ex-
amples simply don’t hold up to scrutiny, such as his reference to a trans-
border agreement signed between Israeli and Palestinian localities over a 
shared resource (a polluted water basin), which he upholds as an example of 
localities engaging in bottom up international law-making.
62
The relation-
ship between Israel and the Palestinian territories has a unique status under 
international law, making examples of their agreements over territorial re-
sources unrepresentative and incomparable to other jurisdictions. What 
Blank upheld as an example of international law being made from the 
ground-up by two localities was, in reality, an agreement forged between an 
occupier nation and a dependent territory. Finally, in certain instances Blank 
overstated his claim, such as when he asserted that the creation of UN-
Habitat, which focuses on empowering cities, brought cities “closer to ob-
taining the status of international legal subjects.”
63
The creation of UN-
Habit, while perhaps emboldening of the claim that cities are now important 
global actors, has in no way brought cities closer to becoming subjects of 
international law, at least in the traditional sense.
64
In sum, though Blank made bold and revolutionary claims––claims that, 
if true, would require an overhaul of the existing state-based international 
legal framework––the empirical record does not bear them out.
65
The struc-
ture of Blank’s article reflects this: As Blank’s article unfolds, he ratchets 
down his assertions, first claiming that cities are close to becoming subjects 
of IL,
66
a groundless claim at odds with IL, then that cities are increasingly 
bound by “international duties, standards and norms,”
67
before finally con-
60. Id. at 906. 
61. Id. at 915–17. 
62. Id. at 906. 
63. Id. at 908. Blank also stated that the World Charter on Local Government could 
conceivably, if adopted, “become jus cogens.” Id. at 906. The term jus cogens (which refers to 
peremptory norms, or norms that are not derogable by states), however, applies only to indi-
vidual principles or rights, not to entire charters or treaties. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (Lori F. Damrosch et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001), at 45. Application of the term jus 
cogens is highly contentious and rare. See Erika de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an In-
ternational Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary Law, 15 
EURO. J. INT’L L. 97 (2004) (debating the application of the term to the prohibition against 
torture, an almost universally recognized human right).
64. While it is true that UN-Habitat focuses on empowering cities and other “human 
settlements” to act more independently, that does not, on its face, say anything about the legal 
status of cities within international law.
65. This will be further highlighted in the sections below. 
66. Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 929. 
67. Id. at 903. 
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cluding only that they are only “exposed” to “international norms, obliga-
tions and tribunals.”
68
Gerald Frug and David Barron’s seminal article, published in the same 
year, makes similarly bold claims, provides similarly informative insights––
and submits similarly weak evidence.
69
The authors looked to three broad 
categories of evidence to support their argument that IL is now decisively 
defining the relationship between cities and their national governments.
70
First, they examined cities’ rise to prominence internationally, as evidenced 
through the formation of city networks,
71
the “municipal foreign policy 
movement,”
72
and the push for a World Charter of Local Self-Government.
73
Second, they looked at “international interventions into city decision-
making,” discussing both UN-Habitat’s Global Campaign on Urban Gov-
ernance and cities’ potential role in monitoring and enforcing international 
human rights law.
74
Third, and most prominently, they examined “interna-
tional controls on city land use powers,” as exemplified in a series of inter-
national arbitral decisions that impacted or involved cities.
75
Turning to the authors’ first category of evidence: While their empirical 
evidence powerfully highlights the emerging relationship between the glob-
al and the local, it does not further their argument––at times explicit and at 
other times implicit ––that cities are now shapers and makers of IL. The au-
thors are right to categorize the rise and spread of city networks as a trans-
national or international trend (though I prefer the word ‘global’ to interna-
tional, as further described below), but not to claim that this trend has 
altered established international law. This phenomenon could more accu-
rately be characterized as part of the new, more “disaggregated” interna-
tional political arena and “networked” world order, where power is diffuse 
and coalitions of actors, both governmental and non-governmental, collec-
tively and on their own, work to effectuate global change.
76
In other words, 
the patterns and examples cited by Frug and Barron are perhaps better clas-
sified as political trends, pertaining to the array of actors now active at the 
international level, rather than international legal developments that have 
altered the traditional nature of international law in any meaningful way. 
While the nature of power is, indeed, changing and diffusing globally, inter-
national law has failed to keep up; indeed, its sources, processes, institu-
68. Id. at 905.
69. See Frug & Barron, supra note 16.
70. Id. at 22. 
71. Id. at 23–27. 
72. Id. at 28. 
73. Id. at 29. This Charter never went beyond draft form. See UN Ctr. for Human Set-
tlements & World Ass’n of Cities and Local Auth. Coordination [WACLAC], Towards a 
World Charter of Local Self-Government: Joint Consultation Document (May 1998), 
http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/charter.html.
74. Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 30–35. 
75. Id. at 36–52. 
76. Anne Marie Slaughter, A NEW WORLD ORDER 131 (2004). 
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tions, and key actors remain largely the same. Scholars like Frug, Barron, 
and Blank seem to be confusing and conflating changes in international po-
litical patterns and arrangements with changes in the foundational legal or-
der that continues to prevail.
Similarly, Frug and Barron’s discussion of the “municipal foreign poli-
cy movement,” while illuminating in its own right, does not pertain to inter-
national law.
77
Their examples focus mostly on rebellious cities that publicly 
oppose their states’ foreign policies. Yet the case law they cite, such as 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade, supports the conclusion that states re-
main in firm control over the affairs, both foreign and domestic, of their 
sub-national governments.
78
Finally, their enthusiasm over the World Char-
ter of Local Self-Government, which would have elevated cities to legal 
subjects under IL if adopted, seems, in retrospect, misplaced.
79
This pro-
posal has gone nowhere and seems, nearly fifteen years later, to largely be 
abandoned.
80
Frug and Barron then turned to evidence of “good urban governance 
and international development,” focusing heavily on the UN-Habitat Cam-
paign on Urban Governance. They asserted that the “concept paper” for this 
campaign
81
established “good urban governance” as an “international legal 
obligation.”
82
This is, at best, a misleading conflation of a variety of legal 
and non-legal norms. As a later UN Human Settlement Program report not-
ed, many of the norms endorsed as core to good urban governance in the 
concept paper––sustainability, subsidiarity, efficiency, safety––”do not have 
77. Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 27–29 (describing the international municipal 
movement as the engagement of local authorities at the international level on issues of interna-
tional importance, autonomous of their national counterparts).
78. Supra note 58, at 372–74. As briefly discussed in regard to Blank’s reliance on 
Crosby, the U.S. Supreme Court actually held that the Massachusetts sanctions on Burma 
were implicitly preempted because they would undermine the “intended purpose and ‘natural 
effect’” of a conflicting federal sanctions statute. Id. at 373. In fact, Frug and Barron admit 
that this case suggests it is “likely” that cities will similarly be unable to engage in “these 
kinds of initiatives.” Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 28.
79. Id. at 29. The World Charter of Local Self-Government was modeled on the Euro-
pean Charter of Local Self-Government, which was adopted in 1993. While it took root at the 
European regional level, it went beyond the draft phase and never took root at the internation-
al level. Though Frug and Barron conceded that the World Charter of Local Self-Government
was still “just an idea,” they nevertheless offered it as “an important indicator of the current 
state of thinking about international local government law because it contains language that 
would revise local government law around the world.” Id.
80. This Charter is largely no longer talked about among diplomats, international city 
networks, or scholars of city diplomacy. 
81. UN-Habitat, The Global Campaign on Urban Governance, U.N. Doc. HS/650/02E 
(Concept Paper: 2d ed., May 2002) [hereinafter Global Campaign on Urban Governance Con-
cept Paper].
82. Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 31. 
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any existence in human rights law,” and the term “urban governance” itself
“does not appear in [any] legally binding texts.”
83
Turning to their third and most robust category of evidence, the authors 
confidently asserted that through “international controls on city land use 
powers,” cities’ international influence leaves the world of “progressive re-
alization”
84
and, presumably, enters the world of actualized realization. As 
proof, they cited to a series of international arbitral decisions over interna-
tional trade agreements as “transforming the traditional domestic legal rela-
tionship between cities and higher levels of government.”
85
But, yet again, 
two of the four cases the authors cited in support of the their argument––
Metaclad v. United Mexican States86 and TECMED87––can actually be cited 
to endorse the opposite conclusion: that states are responsible for the inter-
national legal violations of their sub-national governments.
88
Despite that, 
Frug and Barron concluded that the holdings of Metalclad and TECMED 
are both “striking” and “important” to the development of local government 
law.
89
The two other cases discussed, Republic of Chile v. MTD Equity90 and 
Mondev International Ltd. v. United States,91 come to similar conclusions: 
Cities are demoted in relevance and immunized from legal liability, while 
states are elevated in importance and relevance and are ultimately held re-
sponsible for the actions of their renegade municipalities. In all four cases, 
cities’ ability to operate autonomously from national government control is 
constrained by an international trade agreement.
92
83. UN Human Settlement Program, International Legal Instruments Addressing Good 
Governance (Sept. 2002), at 5, https://mirror.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/2107_
72061_Intl%20legal%20instruments%20good%20gov%20publication.pdf. Notice that norms 
and law are not equivalent––either in the domestic context or in the international legal con-
text. 11 JEFFRY FRIEDEN, DAVID LAKE, & KENNETH SHULTZ, WORLD POLITICS: INTERESTS,
INTERACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 2012).
84. Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 36. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 40–44 (discussing Metalclad Corp v. United Mexican States, supra note 58,
which failed to prevent the city of Guadalcazar from shutting down the private corporation’s
landfill operations but resulted in a multi-million dollar award in favor of the private investor 
and against Mexico––while admitting that important aspects of this case were later over-
turned). 
87. Id. at 45 n.210 (citing TECMED v. United Mexican States, 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004)). 
Frug and Barronnote that the city of Hermosillo successfully refused to allow a private inves-
tor an opportunity to operate a waste treatment facility following widespread public opposi-
tion. But, like in Metaclad, the private investor successfully won its international legal suit 
against the state of Mexico, not against the city. 
88. See Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/97/1, Submission of the Government of the U.S., ¶¶ 3–5 (July 28, 1999), 
https://www.italaw.com/cases/671.
89. Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 41, 47. 
90. Republic of Chile v. MTD Equity, 44 I.L.M. 91 (2005). 
91. Mondev International Ltd. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 85 (2003). 
92. Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 51 (“All four of the cases . . . discussed demon-
strate how arbitration decisions made under international trade agreements have the potential 
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Frug and Barron’s analysis that cities are now shaping IL simply does 
not suffice to refute state supremacy, a tenant of black letter IL. They con-
ceded that international trade law “often prompt[s] states to exert strict regu-
latory control over their local governments” and gives them “new reasons to 
police their cities.”
93
Moreover, international trade agreements, Frug and 
Barron admitted, typically do not address cities specifically, “do not make 
cities directly liable,” are formed between nation-states,
94
and focus narrow-
ly “on the rights of investors and the obligations of the national govern-
ment.”
95
They even conceded in their conclusion that “[a]ny impact on city 
power or central/local relations is likely either to be overlooked or treated as 
irrelevant.”
96
If anything, their legal analysis further reinforces the standard 
view that cities are irrelevant and powerless under IL, including under inter-
national trade agreements.
Where Frug, Barron, and Blank’s conclusions are useful, and exceed-
ingly so, is in their confirmation that the local and global are now connected 
and impacting each other in a variety of consequential new ways. They each 
persuasively argue that IL is influencing cities directly and that cities are, in 
certain instances, influencing IL. This latter argument, while less their focus 
and more my own, is particularly apparent with respect to their discussions 
of international human rights.
In that area, their conclusions reinforce more recent scholarship on cit-
ies’ role as monitors and enforcers of human rights law
97
and on the ways in 
which cities are becoming empowered to “leapfrog” over and above their 
states to further their own progressive agendas. In particular, a review of the 
three authors’ discussions of cities’ involvement with human rights law re-
veals that cities are most successful in advancing human rights norms when 
engaged in shaming, advocacy campaigns, and other soft power tactics, or 
when they incorporate international human rights into their own urban poli-
cies and local ordinances, which transform international law over which cit-
ies have less or no agency into locally enforceable domestic law.
98
These observations were recently confirmed by the research of interna-
tional human rights scholars Barbara Oomen and Moritz Baumgärtel, who 
found that local actors increasingly claim and perform key roles in the reali-
of limiting city power over land use by formulating rules of international local government 
law.”).
93. Id. at 39. 
94. Id. at 38. International trade agreements are solely between states. International in-
vestment treaties, though formed between states, can be considered open-ended contracts be-
tween states and private actors. Frug and Barron seem mostly focused on investment disputes 
under international trade agreements. Id. at 51. 
95. Id. at 52. 
96. Id.
97. See Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5.
98. Id. at 268; Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 33; Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 
5, at 615–16 (discussing how certain cities have codified international treaties, such as the 
Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, into local law).
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zation of IL.
99
Blank seemed right on when he declared, back in 2006, that 
“[l]ocalities have become autonomous enforcers of international norms,” 
specifically avoiding the term “law.”100 Cities are now helping to implement 
and enforce IL, and cities are being affected by international legal norms. 
Where the arguments advanced by Blank, Barron, and Frug fall short, how-
ever, is with respect to the claim that cities are directly shaping and making 
IL and that their actions are decisively starting to impact the system of in-
ternational governance rather than the other way round. A closer examina-
tion reveals that they typically cite international norms and standards rather 
than international law itself; and they often overlook that when these norms 
are challenged in court, cities often fail to advance their cause.
The truth is, cities remain disconnected from black letter IL except 
through the intermediation of states, and no amount of creative lawyering or 
interpretive gymnastics can change that fact, at least so long as the current 
international legal framework remains in place. Until then, we need new 
verbiage and a new prism through which to make sense of the changing role 
of cities in international affairs. Such a framework will be offered in Part 
IV, but first we turn to the myriad ways in which cities are effectively pierc-
ing and influencing the state-centric realm of global politics.
III.  Cities and International Relations
Cities are strengthening their collective voice in international politics 
and leapfrogging over their national governments to engage at the interna-
tional level. To do so, they are using six primary strategies (previewed in 
the introduction to this article), some of which overlap and compound each 
other. Cities are (1) forming into international networks and coalitions; (2) 
allying with international organizations; (3) gaining seats on United Nations 
decision-making bodies and inclusion in multilateral agendas; (4) mirroring
state-based coalitions and hosting their own state-like “international sum-
mits;” (5) utilizing the language of IL to advance their own agendas; and (6) 
adopting non-binding resolutions and agreements and holding each other to 
account. Using these six strategies, cities––especially the world’s largest 





99. Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5, at 621. 
100. Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 924. 
101. Mega-cities are cities that have populations of over 10 million residents. U.N. De-
partment of Economic and Social Affairs, Data Booklet: The World’s Cities in 2018 (2018), 
https://www.un.org/en/events/citiesday/assets/pdf/the_worlds_cities_in_2018_data_booklet.p
df. 
102. Unlike for “mega-city,” there is no single agreed-upon definition of “global city.”
However, most definitions emphasize the importance of economic clout; a global city must 
play a significant role in the global economy. Key examples include New York, London, Par-
is, Tokyo, Hong Kong. Saskia Sassen, a Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago, 
is considered to be among the first scholars to define and conceptualize the term “global city.”
Saskia Sassen, The Global City: Introducing a Concept, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 2 (Win-
ter/Spring 2005). Professor Sassen defined global cities as “the terrain where a multiplicity of 
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achieved a level of participation and influence in international affairs argua-
bly not seen since before the modern post-Westphalian era.
103
Each of these six strategies is deserving of a paper-length analysis on its 
own. For the purposes of this paper, however, each will only be briefly de-
scribed and illustrated through concrete empirical examples.
A. Forming into Networks
Even without formal recognition within IL, cities are charging ahead 
and upward to gain autonomy at the global level.
104
The primary way in 
which cities are doing this is by embracing the power of numbers and form-
ing into coalitions, called “city networks.”
105
Cities have discovered that 
their voices are amplified and their influence enlarged when they act in for-
mal association with other cities, including cities from both within and be-
yond their own national borders.
106
Though not a new phenomenon––the 
rise of city networks can be traced back to at least the early twentieth centu-
ry, if not long before
107
––these networks, particularly international city net-
works,
108
have substantially proliferated in recent decades.
109
With well over 
two hundred international city networks active today, “city diplomacy is no 
rare occurrence.”
110
Indeed, it is now a “widespread phenomenon” that is 
“expanding” and changing the face of international affairs.
111
What is new and different about city networks, when examining their 
objectives throughout the twentieth century to the present, is that many 
globalization processes assume concrete, localized forms.” Id. at 40. Other definitions vary. 
Compare Aaron M. Renn, What Is a Global City?, NEW GEOGRAPHY (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.newgeography.com/content/003292-what-is-a-global-city (defining a global city 
as “a significant production point of specialized financial and producer services that make the 
globalized economy run”), with Victor Kiprop, What Is a Global City?, WORLDATLAS (Oct. 
5, 2017), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-a-global-city.html (defining a global 
city as a “city that plays a significant role in the global economic system”). 
103. See generally THE POWER OF CITIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Simon Curtis 
ed., 2014). 
104. They are also doing this at the national level, but this article focuses on the global 
sphere.
105. City networks are “institutionalized governance structures facilitating city-to-city 
and city-to-other actors cooperation.” Michele Acuto, Mika Morissette, & Agis Tsouros, City 
Diplomacy: Towards More Strategic Networking? Learning with WHO Health Cities 2017, 8 
GLOBAL POLICY 14, 15 (2017). 
106. Michele Acuto & Steve Rayner, City Networks: Breaking Gridlocks or Forging 
(New) Lock-ins, 92 INT’L AFF. 1147, 1159–60 (2016). 
107. Id. at 1155.
108. International city networks are coalitions of three of more cities from at least three 
different countries. These can be contrasted with national city networks, such as the U.S. Con-
ference of Mayors, that include only cities from the same country. See UNITED STATES 
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, https://www.usmayors.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
109. Acuto & Rayner, supra note 106, at 1151.
110. Acuto, Morissette, & Tsouros, supra note 105, at 16.
111. Id.
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(though not all) are now devoting additional resources and energy to inter-
national lobbying, or city diplomacy, at the global level.
112
Unlike the city 
networks of earlier times, which focused largely on city-to-city “twinning” 
initiatives (such as Sister Cities) or gatherings to discuss best practices, 
many of the international city networks active today are not only engaging 
in joint projects and best-practice swapping, but they are also attempting to 
access and influence the international policymaking process in new and un-
precedented ways.
113
This transformation of city diplomacy is described var-
iously as “municipal internationalism,” “transnational municipal network-
ing,” and “municipal foreign policy making.”
114
City networks that participate are said to be in the “International Munic-
ipal Movement.”
115
These include the C40 Climate Leadership Group 
(“C40”),
116









to name just a few. These networks 
have had varying levels of success but, in a few cases, certain large-scale 
networks have acquired legitimate seats at tables that were previously 
112. Michele Acuto, City Diplomacy, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF DIPLOMACY 510,
517 (2016). 
113. Aaron Fishbone, City Networks: Evaluating the Next Frontier of International Re-
lations, Urban and Regional Policy (The German Marshall Fund of the U.S.: Urban and Re-
gional Policy, No. 2, 2017); see Benjamin Leffel & Michele Acuto, Economic Power Founda-
tions of Cities in Global Governance, 32 GLOBAL SOCIETY 281 (2018).
114. Fishbone, supra note 113, at 5; Leffel & Acuto, supra 113, at 281–82. 
115. Kate Baird, A New International Municipalist Movement Is on the Rise––From 
Small Victories to Global Alternatives, OPEN DEMOCRACY (June 7, 2017), 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/new-international-municipalist-
movement-is-on-rise-from-small-vic. 
116. C40 CITIES, About, https://www.c40.org (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). C40 is a net-
work of the world’s megacities commited to addressing climate change; it began with 40 cit-
ies and now has 94. Id.
117. UCLG, Who We Are, https://www.uclg.org (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).  UCLG is an 
umbrella organization for cities, local and regional governments, and municipal associations 
throughout the world defending their interests internationally and promoting democratic local 
self-government. UCLG was founded in 1913 and is the largest of all the city networks, with 
over 240,000 city members in over 140 countries. Id.
118. CITIES ALLIANCE, About, https://wwww.citiesalliance.org (last visited Jan. 13, 
2020). Cities Alliance is a city network that promotes long-term programmatic approaches 
that support national and local governments to develop appropriate policy frameworks, 
strengthen local skills and capacity, undertake strategic city planning, and facilitate invest-
ment.” Id.
119. EUROCITIES, www.eurocities.eu (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). EUROCITIES is a 
network of large cities in Europe, established in 1986 to further economic, political and social 
development in its member cities. Today, EUROCITIES includes local governments of over 
140 of Europe’s major cities from 39 countries, which between them comprise 130 million 
people. Id.
120. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY [ICLEI], About Us, https://iclei.org 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2020). ICLEI “is a global network of more than 1,750 local and regional 
governments committed to sustainable urban development.” Id.
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states-only.
121
For example, UCLG, the behemoth of all the city networks, 
permanently holds ten of the twenty seats on the UN Advisory Committee 
on Local Authorities (“UNACLA”) and serves as its president.
122
By estab-
lishing a formalized position within the UN, even if only on topics pertain-
ing specifically to cities, UCLG has been able to shape various multilateral 
agendas, notably including the Habitat III process and the Sustainable De-
velopment Goals (“SDGs”).
123
According to one scholar who has closely 
studied the rise of city networks, Michele Acuto, “cities are not only critical 
contexts for an urbanizing 21
st
century,” but, through their networks, they 
are proving to be “effective actors, taking part in the dynamics of global 
governance.”
124
The power of international city networks lies in the power of numbers: 
Voices are louder and actions more visible when more actors combine forc-
es. According to a declaration issued by the International Coalition of Inclu-
sive and Sustainable Cities, a network of cities with over 500 members that 
advocates for inclusive urban development:
[W]orking collectively as a network has added value and impact 
because city-to-city collaboration serves as a platform to build a 
common voice in global forums, which reinforces a unified stand 
for sustainable urban development.
125
Networks of networks are also arising, with city networks joining forces 
to advance certain causes or goals, or to simply further amplify their voices. 
UCLG, C40, and ICLEI, which are all members of the Global Taskforce on 
Local and Regional Governments, often conduct campaigns and initiatives 
together, such as their campaign in April 2016 to get the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change to include “Cities and Climate Change” as a plank 
121. Interview with Brendan Shane, Regional Director for North American, C40 (Oct. 
10, 2018), (stating that the C40 has gained a “legitimate seat at the international policy-
making table.”).
122. UN-HABITAT, UN Advisory Committee on Local Authorities [UNACLA], 
https://www.global-taskforce.org/united-nations-advisory-committee-local-authorities (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2020). UNACLA was created in 2000 with the goal of strengthening the dia-
logue between the UN system and local authorities. Id.
123. See UCLG, You Can’t Miss UCLG at the Habitat III Conference in Quito (Sept. 30, 
2016), https://www.uclg.org/en/media/news/you-cant-miss-uclg-habitat-iii-conference-quito. 
Through city networks’ involvement in this process, along with the support of others from 
civil society, UCLG was able to get one of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals 
(“SDGs”), SDG 11, devoted to cities; SDG 11 is focused on building “sustainable cities and 
communities.” UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, Goal 11: Sustainable Cities 
and Communities, https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-
goals/goal-11-sustainable-cities-and-communities.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
124. Michele Acuto, Engaging with Global Urban Governance, in 7 DOING GLOBAL 
URBAN RESEARCH 96, 106 (John Harrison & Michael Holyer eds., 2018). 
125. U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], ICCAR Glob-
al Steering Committee Declaration of Nancy, at 2 (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/declaration_nancy_2018.pdf. 
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of its work program.
126
C40, which began with forty of the world’s largest 
and wealthiest cities but now includes ninety-six cities representing a quar-
ter of the global economy, has been particularly successful at accomplishing 
its agenda, likely due in part to its ample resources and celebrity endorse-
ment.
127
Created in 2005, C40 is now focused, first and foremost, on “deliv-
ering on the most ambitious goals of the Paris [Climate] Agreement at the 
local level”––by ensuring that its members commit to meeting (or exceed-
ing) the obligations contained in the Paris Agreement irrespective of wheth-
er their national counterparts have made this commitment.
128
To advance its 
efforts, C40 has gone beyond mere knowledge-sharing, becoming a world-
renowned international lobbyist and actively working to shape global policy 
discussions on climate change. Through its lobbying work, C40 has been 
instrumental in connecting its member cities with global policy-makers and 
forums by, for example, arranging for high-profile city-led events to be held 
alongside high-profile state-led events, as further described below.
129
In 
short, large-scale city networks like C40 not only serve as a connector be-
tween and among cities but also as a connector between the local and the 
global.
130
B. Allying with International Organizations
Cities’ increased participation and influence at the international level 
has been facilitated by a close and supportive relationship with certain key 
international organizations. For over a decade, the UN Center for Human 
Settlements (“UN-Habitat”), the EU, the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Health Organization (“WHO”), and the World Bank––among other interna-
tional, transnational, and regional organizations––have promoted the im-
portance and centrality of cities to their development goals.
131
Certain re-
126. E.g., GLOBAL TASKFORCE OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS, C40, ICLEI, 
and UCLG Support Proposed IPCC Special Report on Cities and Climate Change (Mar. 30, 
2016), https://www.global-taskforce.org/c40-iclei-and-uclg-support-proposed-ipcc-special-
report-cities-and-climate-change. 
127. See C40 CITIES, About, supra note 116. C40 is financially backed, in part, by 
Bloomberg Philanthropies, and former mayor Michael Bloomberg has been very involved and 
active in his support for this network; he continues to serve as the president of the board. See
C40 CITIES, Board of Directors, https://www.c40.org/board_of_directors (last visited Jan. 13, 
2019).
128. Id.
129. See infra, Part III.D.
130. Chan, supra note 1, at 151. 
131. For example, the World Bank devotes a portion of its vast portfolio to “urban de-
velopment,” which itself is carved up into distinct thematic areas, including “sustainable cities 
and communities” and “inclusive cities.” For each of these themes, the World Bank has pro-
jects and teams in place to support them. See WORLD BANK, Urban Development,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/urbandevelopment (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). The 
World Bank, together with the International Monetary Fund and others, hosts an annual “Ur-
banization and Poverty Reduction” research conference. See WORLD BANK, 5th Urbanization 
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gional intergovernmental organizations, such as the Council of Europe, have 
gone even further to advocate for the city-empowering concepts of “decen-
tralization,” “subsidiarity,” and enhanced local autonomy in their official 
policy pronouncements and press releases.
132
Various scholars have noted 
that cities’ alliances with powerful international organizations have been in-
strumental in propelling them onto the world stage by giving them both a 
voice and a formal platform, in addition to recognition, in the historically 
states-only halls of global governance.
133
There is a growing tendency for 
cities, particularly large global cities, and international organizations to rec-
ognize that they have a “convergence of interests,” or a “common agen-
da.”
134
Just as cities are finding it “harder, if not impossible . . . to accomplish 
[their] governance, economic and wellbeing goals without considering in-
ternational action,”
135
international organizations have simultaneously rec-
ognized that cities are the “privileged loc[i]” for achieving their own sus-
tainable development goals.
136
Frug and Barron first recognized this 
and Poverty Reduction Research Conference (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.worldbank.org/
en/events/2018/05/02/5th-urbanization-and-poverty-reduction-research-conference. UN-
Habitat is focused on human settlements and sustainable urban development. See UN-
HABITAT, About Us, https://unhabitat.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 22, 2020). The Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], which works closely with UN-
Habitat, is an intergovernmental organization focused on sustainable development. One of its 
area of focus includes “urban development,” and it hosts the “OECD Roundtable of Mayors 
and Ministers” in order for local and national leaders to engage in policy dialogue on urban 
issues. See OECD, OECD Work on Cities, http://www.oecd.org/cfe/regional-
policy/urbandevelopment.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
132. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 10 Years (2007–2017) of Intercultural Cities: Mak-
ing Diversity Work for Cities, Press Release, Ref. DC 173 (2017); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Paris 
Joins Council of Europe Intercultural Cities Network, Press Release, Ref. DC 055 (2016); 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Rotterdam: Summit of Mayors for the ”Alliance of European cities 
against violent extremism”, Press Release, Ref. CG-CP034 (2016); COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
Making Cities Resilient, Chamber of Local Authorities, CPL 22(2) (Mar. 2, 2012), 
https://rm.coe.int/090000168071a65d; see also Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Or-
der, supra note 48, at 267. The European Charter of Local Self Government was adopted by 
the Council of Europe and opened for signature in 1985; all 47 members of the Council have 
adopted this charter. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, A Charter for Local Democracy,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/congress/european-charter-of-local-self-government (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2019).
133. See, e.g., Porras, supra note 12; Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order,
supra note 48; Frug & Barron, supra note 16; Acuto, supra note 124, at 106. 
134. Porras, supra note 12, at 555 (“When cities turned to international organizations, 
they thus found a receptive audience and a ready embrace. . . . [T]he city was considered to 
offer the greatest potential for democratic empowerment, accountability, flexibility, [and] re-
sponsiveness to major stakeholders (including international organizations, public and private 
investors) and local knowledge. . . . The result was that international organizations, respond-
ing to cities’ demands, have adopted the city as an ideal partner to realize their development 
goals.”); see Blank, The City and the World, supra note 26, at 879–80. 
135. Acuto et al., ‘City Diplomacy’ and Twinning: Lessons from the UK, China and 
Globally 24 (UK Gov’t Office for Science: Future of Cities, Working Paper, 2016).
136. Porras, supra note 12, at 576. 
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connection well over a decade ago, and it forms a core part of their research 
agenda on international local government law, as previously discussed. 
Their recognition of the connection between cities and international organi-
zations inspired a broader “refocus on cities as the objects of international 
norms,” a topic that has been extended and deepened by a variety of other 
scholars, including Barbara Oomen, Martha David, and Moritz Baumgärtel, 
and researchers affiliated with the Asser Institute’s project on global cities 
and international law, including Miha Marcenko, Janne Nijman, and Helmut 
Aust.
137
Cities and their networks now regularly partner with international or-
ganizations. The UCLG alone has an endless list of partnerships, including 
with the European Commission, Agence Française de Développement, the 
International Labour Organization, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, the World Bank, the UN Development Pro-
gram, the International Monetary Fund, and the UN Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”).
138
These alliances not only help 
city networks to acquire the necessary resources and tools to pursue their 
local and global agendas, but they provide access to the international poli-
cymaking world and give the networks a more formal and identifiable plat-
form than they would otherwise have on their own. Linking up with an in-
ternational organization, especially one that is already active in international 
policy debates, can give cities and their networks access to those debates 
and, therefore, an opportunity to influence them.
For example, the UCLG linked up with the International Organization 
for Migration (“IOM”), the leading inter-governmental organization in the
field of migration, in November 2017 to draft and then issue the Mechelen 
Declaration, a statement calling for a greater role and voice for city gov-
ernments in the adoption of a Global Compact on Migration.
139
The impri-
137. E.g., Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5; GLOBAL URBAN JUSTICE: THE RISE OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS CITIES, supra note 15. Researchers Aust and Nijman at the Asser Institute are 
currently working on compiling a co-edited Handbook on International Law and Cities to be 
published by Edward Edgar Publishing. I am co-authoring a chapter for this Handbook with 
Professor Sheila Foster of Georgetown law; it is entitled “The Urbanization of International 
Legal Relations: Cities Rising Soft Power and Soft Law in the Global Context.”
138. UCLG, International Organisations, https://www.uclg.org/en/partners/
international-organisations (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
139. Global Conference on Cities and Migration, Mechelen Declaration on Cities and 
Migration [hereinafter Mechelen Declaration] (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/Mechelen-Declaration-final.pdf; Ana 
Maria Lebada, Cities Adopt Declaration for Global Compact on Migration, SDG
KNOWLEDGE HUB: A PROJECT BY IISD (Dec. 5, 2017), http://sdg.iisd.org/news/cities-adopt-
declaration-for-global-compact-on-migration (“The [Mechelen] Declaration builds on the 
SDGs, the New Urban Agenda and the New York Declaration on Migrants and Refugees. In 
an annex, it presents the mayors and leaders’ actionable commitments, means of implementa-
tion, and a monitoring and evaluation mechanism, which serves as the basis for the first fol-
low-up and review of the migration-related commitments included in the New Urban Agenda. 
The document recognizes the importance of a community-driven approach to local urban gov-
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matur of the IOM legitimated and amplified the call for cities’ involvement 
in global policy discussions on migration and led to the creation of a 
“Mayor’s Mechanism,” which now provides a formal channel for local gov-
ernments to be involved in these global discussions.
140
As previously mentioned, this relationship is reciprocal: International 
organizations also ally with cities to advance their own goals. For example, 
the WHO’s Healthy Cities Program has worked closely with localities for 
more than three decades to ensure that issues of health are included in the 
agendas of city governments.
141
The alliance between cities and the WHO 
led, in November 2016, to the Shanghai Declaration on Promoting Health in 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which formally recognized 
cities as “critical settings for health” and, therefore, essential contributors to 
international policy discussions on health.
142
Similarly, the World Bank, 
which views urban development as key to resolving issues of global pov-
erty, routinely emphasizes the idea that urbanization is one of the key global 
trends of the twenty-first century.
143
As with migration and health, linking cities to the problem of global 
poverty has helped to position cities as legitimate participants in interna-
tional policy discussions on poverty, as evidenced by their inclusion in Sus-
tainable Development Goal 11.
144
The World Economic Forum recently 
acknowledged that cities are transforming how foreign policy is conducted. 
Cities, it asserts, are now engaging in “paradiplomacy,” or parallel diploma-
cy separate and autonomous from their national leaders.
145
They are opening 
up their own international affairs offices abroad in order to represent their 
own local interests and foster international collaborations, participating in 
“international multilateral arrangements,” ensuring that their international 
roles are codified in their country’s foundational documents, and adopting 
ernance that benefits communities of origin, transit, and destination as well as migrants, refu-
gees, returnees and internally displaced people (IDPs).”) 
140. The creation of the Mayor’s Mechanism is discussed in more depth, infra, Part 
III.C.
141. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], Types of Healthy Settings,
https://www.who.int/healthy_settings/types/cities/en (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
142. Ninth Global Conference on Health Promotion, Shanghai Declaration on Promot-
ing Health in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Nov. 24, 2016), 
https://www.who.int/healthpromotion/conferences/9gchp/shanghai-declaration.pdf. 
143. See WORLD BANK, Urban Development, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
urbandevelopment (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
144. See UNITED NATIONS, Sustainable Dev. Goal 11,
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11 (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). SDG 11 is focused 
on “sustainable cities and communities.” Id.
145. Rodrigo Tavares, Forget the Nation-State: Cities Will Transform the Way We Con-
duct Foreign Affairs, WORLD ECON. F. (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2016/10/forget-the-nation-state-cities-will-transform-the-way-we-conduct-foreign-
affairs.
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their own foreign policy “actions plans,” “white papers,” and “government 
plans.”
146
Public international organizations are not the only ones allying with cit-
ies. Alliances are also common between cities and private international or-
ganizations. While not as directly linked to the international policymaking 
world, these private institutions have helped to further the idea that cities are 
essential to solving our global challenges. The Rockefeller Foundation, a 
private international charitable organization, has worked with city govern-
ments since 2013 through its 100 Resilient Cities program, which focuses 
on preparing cities to be ready for the physical, social, and economic chal-
lenges of the twenty-first century.
147
The Foundation’s idea that cities need 
to be resilient and ready for disasters trickled into the UN’s agenda, through 
the “making cities resilient” campaign launched by the UN Office for Disas-
ter Risk Reduction and the Sendai Framework.
148
While not as directly giv-
ing cities a global voice or a platform to further their own policy agendas, 
the 100 Resilient Cities program exemplifies how a privately funded initia-
tive focused on empowering cities caught the attention of the United Na-
tions and helped to promote the idea that cities are central to global policies 
on resiliency.
Cities and city networks are finding ways to effectively leverage their 
alliances with international organizations, both governmental and private, in 
order to further promote the critical roles that cities play––or should play––
in twenty-first century global governance.
C. Gaining Recognition in Multilateral Agendas
Cities and city networks are increasingly recognized as important global 
actors, with critical perspectives, valuable experience, and useful insights to 
contribute to international policymaking discussions. In October of 2016, 
for example, the vast majority of the world’s states––170 to be exact––
agreed to adopt a “New Urban Agenda,” an international, UN-led long-term 
mission that acknowledges that cities will grow massively over the next 




147. 100 RESILIENT CITIES, About Us, http://www.100resilientcities.org/about-us (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
148. UN OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, Making Cities Resilient,
https://www.unisdr.org/we/campaign/cities (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
149. G.A. Res. 71/256, The New Urban Agenda (Dec. 23, 2016), http://habitat3.org/the-
new-urban-agenda. The New Urban Agenda was issued in Quito, Ecuador at the end of 2016. 
It explicitly calls for greater cooperation between national and local authorities to address the 
challenges of forced migration. The Agenda stresses the need to invest in “synergies between 
international migration and development at the global, regional, national, subnational and lo-
cal levels by ensuring safe, orderly and regular migration through planned and well-managed 
migration policies, and . . . supporting local authorities in establishing frameworks that enable 
the positive contribution of migrants to cities and strengthened urban-rural linkages.” Robert 
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was adopted at the Habitat III conference in Ecuador, an event that “cata-
lyzed the world’s attention to cities as the places where a global agenda for 
sustainable development can start.”
150
During this conference, cities and 
their networks were “firmly on the front stage, notably C40 Cities and 
UCLG, with visible performances, commitments and interventions” 
throughout.
151
According to city network scholar Michele Acuto, “[t]his tells 
us that cities are not only critical contexts for an urbanizing 21
st
century, 
they can be effective actors, taking part in the dynamics of global govern-
ance.”
152
This same recognition is codified in a variety of other international in-
struments and agendas as well, including the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals (goal eleven, specifically), which form the core of the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development; the Paris Climate Agreement; the Addis Aba-
ba Action Agenda; the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction; and 
the UN Conference on the Environment and Development, all of which, to 
one extent or another, center around the idea that sustainable urbanization is 
key to successful development. Moreover, an entire UN agency, UN-
Habitat, was created in 1978 to focus on urban themes, initiatives, and 
knowledge; it claims to have “a unique and a universally acknowledged ex-
pertise in all things urban” due to its decades of experience working with 
cities.
153
UN-Habitat was arguably the first major UN initiative to catalyze 
the world’s attention to cities as the places where a global agenda for sus-
tainable development can start.
154
Today it is focused on enacting the New 
Urban Agenda (“NUA”), an agenda focused on the idea that a sustainable 
future starts in cities and on the “transformative power of urbanization,” as 
well as implementing SDG eleven.
155
The NUA underlines the linkages be-
tween urbanization and job creation, livelihood opportunities, and improved 
quality of life, which should be included in every urban renewal policy and 
strategy.
156
The importance of cities to global governance and to solving our global 
challenges is not a new idea. Before the “New Urban Agenda” of 2016, the 
Muggah & Adriana Abdenur, Refugees and the City: The Twenty-First-Century Front Line 7
(World Refugee Council, Working Paper No. 2, 2018). 
150. UN-HABITAT, UNACLA, supra note 122.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. UN-HABITAT, UN-Habitat at a Glance, https://unhabitat.org (last visited Jan. 13, 
2020).
154. UN-HABITAT, About Us, https://unhabitat.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
155. UN HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, World Cities Rep. 2016, at 35 (July 14, 
2016), https://doi.org/10.18356/d201a997-en; SUSTAINABILITY ACTIVE, UN-Habitat Assem-
bly 2019 Focuses on the New Urban Agenda and Sustainable Urban Development (May 29, 
2019), https://sustainabilityactive.com/2019/05/un-habitat-assembly-2019-focuses-on-the-
new-urban-agenda-nua-and-sustainable-urban-development; UN-HABITAT, Implementing the 
New Urban Agenda, https://mirror.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=9 (last visited Jan. 13, 
2020). 
156. See G.A. Res. 71/256, The New Urban Agenda (Dec. 23, 2016).
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UN launched a Global Campaign on Urban Governance in 1999
157
and be-
fore that, the “First World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities” in 
1996,
158
and the “Local Agenda 21” in 1992.
159
Each of these identifies cities 
as key stakeholders and participants in the UN’s development goals.
Several formal institutions and permanent platforms now exist within 
the UN for cities to participate in global policymaking on a regular basis. 
For example, the Global Taskforce on Local and Regional Governments, 
which was created in 2013 and convenes the World Assembly of Local and 
Regional Governments, provides a “permanent structure [for states] to coor-
dinate their [local and regional governments’] partnership with the UN.”
160
In what the UCLG describes as a “landmark achievement,” the World 
Assembly is acknowledged in the New Urban Agenda, confirming that 
while national governments continue to play the “leading role” in the im-
plementation of urban policies and legislation for sustainable urban devel-
opment, subnational and local governments can offer “equally important 
contributions” throughout this process.
161
As discussed above, the Global 
Task Force can also boast about the inclusion of a stand-alone SDG focused 
on cities, SDG 11, and the emphasis in all seventeen SDGs on local imple-
mentation and monitoring, for which they successfully lobbied.
162
While 
these additions and successes might, at first glance, seem insignificant and 
without real impact, the fact that they occurred––that cities are mentioned as 
having “equally important” contributions to national governments, for ex-
ample––is in and of itself an impactful and meaningful development in the 
state-focused world of international politics, which is guided by the even 
more state-centric international legal framework.
The UN has also created institutional roles for certain powerful city 
networks. For example, a report commissioned by the UN Secretary General 
in 2003 paved the way for the UCLG to take on a permanent advisory role 
within the UN.
163
As previously mentioned, UCLG now holds the presiden-
157. UN-HABITAT, The Global Campaign for Urban Governance (Mar. 2002), 
http://mirror.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=1537. 
158. HABITAT III, Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments, supra note 24. 
159. See U.N. Conf. on Env’t and Dev., Agenda 21, ¶¶ 7.13–7.26, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26, (Aug. 12, 1992), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/
Agenda21.pdf. 
160. HABITAT III, Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments, supra note 24. 
161. G.A. Res. 71/256, The New Urban Agenda ¶15(b) (Dec. 23, 2016).
162. GLOBAL TASKFORCE OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS, Our Work,
https://www.global-taskforce.org/our-work (last visited Apr. 11, 2020). 
163. In 2003, the Secretary General of the United Nations established a Panel of Emi-
nent Persons, chaired by Fernando Enrique Cardoso, the former President of Brazil, to review 
the relationship between the United Nations and civil society. Proposal 18 of the resulting 
“Cardoso Report,” as it has come to be called, recommended that the United Nations “regard 
United Cities and Local Governments as an advisory body on governance matters.” Panel of 
Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, Letter dated June 7, 2004 from 
the Panel Chair to the Secretary-General, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/58/817 (June 11, 2004), 
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cy and half the seats on the UN Advisory Committee of Local Authorities, a 
deliberative forum housed within UN-Habitat.
164
Today, UNACLA serves as 
an international forum where local governments can convey their opinions 
and perspectives to the UN and other international actors, entirely inde-
pendent of their national governments, and thus, can directly participate in 
the shaping and implementing of certain global agendas, notably those per-
taining to the UN’s broadly construed Habitat agenda.
165
Cities and city networks feature particularly prominently in multilateral 
agendas pertaining to climate change. As early as 1992, cities were recog-
nized as relevant stakeholders in climate-related policy discussions in the 
UN’s Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.
166
Since then, cit-
ies have become the focus of many international, regional, and transnational 
initiatives, declarations, and agreements on climate change.
167
Relying large-
ly on the argument that local and regional authorities are the “closest level 
of public administration to citizens” and the ones responsible for making 
many of the actual decisions involved in implementing international agree-
ments, cities––with the support of certain powerful international organiza-
tions––have successfully convinced the UN that municipalities and city 
networks should have a voice in shaping climate-related international poli-
cies.
168
The establishment of certain large-scale and well-endowed city net-
works, such as the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy
169
and C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group helped this argument.
170
In 2014, 
former Mayor Michael Bloomberg was named the UN Special Envoy for 
Cities and Climate Change
171
and, in 2016, during the twenty-second Con-
ference of the Parties for the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/09916F545454357BC1256F5C005D
4352/$file/A-58-817.pdf.
164. UN-HABITAT, UNACLA, supra note 122; UCLG, Presidency 2019–2022,
https://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/presidency (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
165. UN-HABITAT, UNACLA, supra note 122. 
166. U.N. Conf. on Env’t and Dev., Agenda 21, supra note 159.
167. See OECD, Cities and Climate Change (Nov. 29, 2010), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/cities-and-climate-change_9789264091375-en. 
168. See OECD ET AL., International Coalition on Multi-Level and Multi-Stakeholder 
Climate Governance for the Implementation of the Paris Agreement, at 1, (2018) 
https://www.climate-chance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/why-is-a-multi-stakeholder-
approach-to-climate-change-more-relevant.pdf. 
169. GLOBAL COVENANT OF MAYORS FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY, Who We Are,
https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/about (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). The Global Cove-
nant of Mayors for Climate and Energy was formed when the European Covenant of Mayors 
merged with the Global Compact of Mayors. The Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and 
Energy now includes over 9,000 cities, representing over 10% of the global population. Id.
170. C40 CITIES, About, supra note 116.
171. Press Release, United Nations, Secretary General Appoints Michael R. Bloomberg 
of United States Special Envoy for Climate Action, U.N. Press Release SG/A/1791*-
BIO/5069*-ENV/DEV/1836 (March 5, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/
sga1791.doc.htm. 
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Change (UNFCC) in Morocco, a whole day was devoted to cities, towns, 
and regions, and their role in implementing the Paris Agreement.
172
Cities have had similar success in convincing global policy makers of 
their relevance to migration-related policy debates at the international level, 
an easy sell given that cities are home to the vast majority of the world’s 
migrants and refugees. In 2013, the UN General Assembly created a formal 
institution, the Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Devel-
opment as “an incubating space where local leaders can share practical and 
inventive solutions for governing migration and promoting inclusive urban 
economic growth,” as well as “inform, and be informed by, national and in-
ternational policymaking.”
173
And in 2018, an even more robust platform 
was created, the “Mayor’s Mechanism,” which allows cities to directly en-
gage with the Global Forum on Migration and Development (“GFMD”), a 
state-led forum that is responsible for shaping the global debate on migra-
tion and development.
174
Thanks to the Mayor’s Mechanism, cities now 
have a formal, institutionalized platform from which to engage in migration-
related international policy debates alongside nation-states. According to the 
GFMD’s own website, the Mayor’s Mechanism is “a means to formalize the 
relationship between the government-led GFMD process and the local au-
thorities participating in the Mayoral Forum.”
175
In what was viewed as a 
major achievement for cities in international politics, the Global Compact 
on Refugees
176
and the Global Compact of Migration,
177
both adopted in De-
cember of 2018, repeatedly reference local authorities and networks of cit-
ies.
178
Immediately following their adoption, on the very same day, mayors
and city leaders from around the globe came together to sign their own 
agreement, the Marrakesh Mayoral Declaration, calling for the full and for-
172. U.N. NEWS, Marrakech: Cities Are Striving to Play a Key Role in Implementing 
Paris Climate Accord (Nov. 10, 2016), https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/11/545002-
marrakech-cities-are-striving-play-key-role-implementing-paris-climate-accord. The twenty-
first Conference of the Parties approved this time allocation. Id.
173. MIGRATION FOR DEVELOPMENT, Global Mayoral Forum,
http://www.migration4development.org/en/events/global-mayoral-forum (last visited Jan. 13, 
2020). 
174. Stefan Rother, Mayors Mechanism Will Become Part of the #GFMD This Year,
THE GFMD, MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (blog) (Jan. 14, 2019), 
https://gfmd2010.wordpress.com/2019/01/14/mayors-mechanism-will-become-part-of-the-
gfmd-this-year-thouez-bolsters-position-of-gfmd-in-supporting-implementation-of-global-
compact-formigration. The Mayor’s Mechanism was conceived during the fifth Mayoral Fo-
rum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development, which took place in Marrakech, Mo-
rocco and had as its theme “City Leadership in Implementing the UN Global Compacts.” Id.
175. GLOBAL FORUM ON MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT [GFMD], The GFMD 
Mayors Mechanism, https://www.gfmd.org/process/gfmd-mayors-mechanism (last visited Jan. 
13, 2020). 
176. See Rep. of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ¶¶ 37–38, U.N. Doc. 
A/73/12 (Part II) (2018). 
177. See G.A. Res. 73/195, ¶¶ 18(c), 44 (Jan. 11, 2019). 
178. Rother, supra note 174.
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mal recognition of the role of local authorities in the implementation, fol-
low-up, and review of both compacts.
179
The UN High Commissioner on 
Refugees enthusiastically embraced the declaration in a speech highlighting 
the necessity of working with city leaders to solve the global refugee cri-
sis.
180
Though roadblocks emerge when attempts are made to elevate cities to
a status akin to nation-states under international law, as evidenced by the 
failure of the World Charter on Local Self-Government,
181
cities and city 
networks are decidedly part of the UN’s agenda and organizational structure 
today.
182
Indeed, the UN is so focused on urbanization these days that a re-
cently commissioned independent report reviewing the Habitat agenda rec-
ommended creating a whole new UN body, called UN-Urban, to act as a 
coordinating mechanism across all UN agencies on urban matters.
183
This 
recommendation reflects the growing importance of cities across all UN 
agencies, not just UN-Habitat.
With increased participation has come increased confidence, success, 
and influence. Cities and city networks are now openly declaring their right 
to be involved not just as observers, consultants, or tag-alongs of their na-
tional governments, but as key stakeholders and even “equal partners in 
shaping global policy.”
184
Such bold statements were not heard, or at least 
openly voiced, in the past.
D. Mirroring State-Based Coalitions, Events, and Structures
Another strategy increasingly used by cities and their networks to in-
crease their influence in global policymaking is the attempt to mimic the ac-
tions of states. This allows them, in certain instances, to gain the attention of 
the media as well as the states whose actions and events they are mimicking. 
This is typically done on the sidelines of, or in the lead-up to, high-profile 
states-only international forums and events. For example, during the COP15 
Climate Summit held in Copenhagen in 2009, while 114 heads-of-state 
gathered to negotiate over international climate policies, 200 mayors attend-
179. FIFTH MAYORAL FORUM ON HUMAN MOBILITY, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
The Marrakech Mayors Declaration, at 2 (Dec. 8, 2018).
180. Ariane Rummery, UNHCR Welcomes Global Mayors’ Commitment to Refugees,
UN AGENCY ON REFUGEES [UNHCR] (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/
2018/12/5c0d06a34/unhcr-welcomes-global-mayors-commitment-refugees.html.
181. See Gerhard Engel & Alan Lloyd, Report on Draft World Charter of Local Self-
Government State of Discussions––CPL (8) 5 Part II, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
https://rm.coe.int/1680719e98 (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). For a discussion of the failure of the 
World Charter, see supra text accompanying notes 79–80. 
182. See Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 25–27. 
183. Michele Acuto, Cities Are Gaining Power in Global Politics––Can the UN 
Keep Up?, THE CONVERSATION, (Sept. 14, 2017), http://theconversation.com/cities-are-
gaining-power-in-global-politics-can-the-un-keep-up-83668. 
184. GLOBAL PARLIAMENT OF MAYORS, Newsletter (May 2, 2019) (emphasis added), 
https://mailchi.mp/8296785d6e07/gpm-newsletter-march-507985.
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ed a parallel climate summit held in the same city.
185
While the states-only 
COP15 ended without agreement or consensus (and thus in failure), the 
mayor-led parallel summit ended in widespread agreement on a variety of 
collaborative efforts and was widely viewed as a success. Cities have been 
active on the sidelines of all the COPs ever since.
186
Another key example involves the Group of 20 (or the “G20”), whose 
twenty member states represent the world’s most economically and politi-
cally powerful states.
187
Since its formation in 1999, it has been tasked with 
discussing and drafting policies pertaining to global financial stability.
188
While the G20 has seven different engagement groups that allow for input 
from non-state actors, until 2018 there was no formal group or platform for 
cities. Cities took things into their own hands in December 2017 and created 
the Urban 20, or U20, on the margins of the One Planet Summit in Paris.
189
The C40 and UCLG, along with the mayors of Buenos Aires and Paris, took 
the lead in creating this new state-like platform comprised of the world’s 
most politically and economically powerful cities, which now issue state-
like statements, declarations, and communiqués, and hold state-like summits 
on the sidelines of the states-only summits––including the G20 meetings.
190
In contrast to the often competitive or confrontational diplomacy between 
states in intergovernmental multilateral institutions, particularly the highly 
influential ones like the G20, cities and the institutions they create empha-
size their shared challenges and the need to work collaboratively together in 
order to solve these shared challenges. According to one scholar who close-
ly tracks the U20:
[C]ities are much more positive and willing to engage in the topic 
for mutual benefits . . . they have the willingness to listen, collabo-
rate, help and support each other. There’s a lot of love and mutual 
respect among C40 mayors: friendly cooperation, open-arms . . .
something that you’ll never see when you gather the G20.
191
185. The Climate Summit for Mayors was held from December 14–17 in the city of Co-
penhagen, where the COP15 was being held. See Hang Ryeol Na & Gordon M. Heisler, C40 
Large Cities Climate Summit 2009, from Seoul to Copenhagen, 34 INT’L ASS’N FOR URB.
CLIMATE 2–5, https://www.fs.usda.gov/treesearch/pubs/34270. 
186. See e.g., LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES [LGMA], 
UNFCCC Climate Change Conference, https://www.cities-and-regions.org/2017-cop23 (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2019). 
187. GROUP OF 20 [G20], What Is the G20?, https://g20.org/en/about/Pages/whatis.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
188. See id.
189. Ian Klaus, The Urban 20: A Contemporary Diplomatic History, DIPLOMATIC 
COURIER (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/the-urban-20-a-
contemporary-diplomatic-history.
190. Id.
191. Chan, supra note 1, at 151. 
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Similarly, and as described briefly above, cities met in Mechelen, Bel-
gium for the Global Conference on Cities and Migration in November 2017 
in advance of a December 2017 states-only intergovernmental meeting on 
the Global Compact on Migration.
192
During the meeting they consolidated 
their views on this Compact, came up with a list of recommendations, and 
codified them in the Mechelen Declaration, which was then submitted to the 
state-led event in December in an attempt to influence their discussions.
193
The Global Compact on Migration adopted one year later, in December of 
2018, incorporated elements of the Mechelen Declaration, recommending 
state cooperation with “local authorities” to implement and monitor Com-
pact objectives.
194
This shows that state-like city-led events and state-like 
but city-crafted documents can and are having very real effects on interna-
tional policymaking.
195
Cities and city networks not only hold side-events alongside high-level 
intergovernmental events in an attempt to shape the contents of international 
agreements, but in order to influence their implementation as well. For ex-
ample, the International Coalition of Inclusive and Sustainable Cities 
(“ICCAR”), a large city network established by UNESCO in 2004, held an 
event in Nancy, France while an intergovernmental event to finalize and 
adopt the two Global Compacts (on Refugees and on Migration) was held in 
Morocco.
196
During ICCAR’s event, participating cities adopted the Nancy 
Declaration, which confirmed their commitment to upholding the two Glob-
al Compacts, but in a way that eliminates opportunities for prejudice and 
bigotry by highlighting “the positive and multiple contributions of these 
groups [migrants and refugees] to all spheres of life in receiving, transition 
and origin countries.”
197
It also renewed their pledge to “develop effective 
responses to the rise of hate, bigotry and violent extremism,” and recog-
192. UCLG COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL INCLUSION, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS, Global Conference on Cities and Migrants, https://www.uclg-
cisdp.org/en/news/events/global-conference-cities-and-migrants-mechelen (last visited Apr. 
12, 2020). 
193. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, Global Conference on Cities 
and Migration (Nov. 20, 2017), https://belgium.iom.int/news/global-conference-cities-and-
migration. 
194. Compare Mechelen Declaration, supra note 139, with G.A. Res. 73/195, Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, ¶¶ 18(c), 19(c), 20, 21(e), 23(k), 24(c), 
28(c), 30(e), 32(f), 35(j), 37(i), 39(c), 44, 53 (Dec. 19, 2018) (listing cooperation with local 
authorities as a means to realize various compact objectives).
195. See UCLG, Mayors and Governors Around the World Adopted the Mechelen Dec-
laration on Cities and Migration (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.uclg.org/en/media/news/
mayors-and-governors-around-world-adopted-mechelen-declaration-cities-and-migration. 
196. See MODERN DIPLOMACY, Cities Rally Against Hate, Discrimination, Racism, and 
Violent Extremism (Dec. 14, 2018), https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/12/14/cities-rally-
against-hate-discrimination-racism-and-violent-extremism. 
197. UNESCO, ICCAR Global Steering Committee Declaration of Nancy, supra note 
125.
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nized the important role that cities and city networks play in implementing 
UN policies.
198
City networks are also mirroring regional state-based organizations. 
UCLG Africa attempts to mimic many of the things that the African Union 
would normally be expected to do,
199
while the Congress of Local and Re-
gional Authorities, which is structured like a traditional congressional body 
with two chambers composed of representatives that serve 4-year terms, at-
tempts to perform many of the roles traditionally played by the Council of 
Europe.
200
By attempting to mirror or mimic these regional organizations, 
these city networks are, like many of the examples cited above, not only at-
tempting to advance their own agendas, but to catch the eye of regional 
state-based organizations in an effort to shape their policy agendas.
More and more, cities are also engaging in their own international––or 
what I would call “global”––relations, separate and autonomous from their 
national counterparts. One way they are doing this is by mimicking the ac-
tions and structures of their federal governments and setting up their own 
offices of international affairs. According to the Nina Hachigian, the first 
deputy mayor for international affairs in Los Angeles, cities are increasingly 
“global actors in their own right.” Hachigian, a former U.S. Ambassador, 
has written about how her work with the city of Los Angeles has been simi-
lar to her work as a diplomat for the U.S. government:
I’ve found in my transition to municipal government that I still in-
teract with diplomats all the time, negotiate the texts of agreements, 
and attend meetings between heads of state and my principal [in 
this case, the mayor of Los Angeles]. The difference is the immedi-
acy of the results, which is gratifying, and the aim to deliver to the 
people in just a single metropolis.
201
Los Angeles is not alone in creating an international affairs unit or appoint-
ing a lead city diplomat to handle its global engagements. With “the over-
whelming majority of cities and states [now] conducting foreign affairs,” 
many cities are realizing that they require dedicated staff and specialized 
offices to carry out this consuming task.
202
According to a recent report on 
198. Id.
199. UCLG, 8th Africities Summit: Envisioning the Future for the African Region,
https://www.uclg.org/en/taxonomy/term/1620 (last visited Jan. 13, 2020); AFRICAN UNION, 
What We Do: AU in a Nutshell, https://au.int/en/au-nutshell (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
200. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, A European Assembly of Local and Regional Elected Repre-
sentatives, https://www.coe.int/en/web/congress/overview (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). The 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities is made up of two chambers: the Chamber of Lo-
cal Authorities and the Chamber of Regions. The Congress has 324 representatives and 324 
substitutes, all appointed for four years, representing over 150,000 local and regional authori-
ties in the Council of Europe’s 47 member states. The Congress’s work is organized within 
three committees: a Monitoring Committee, a Governance Committee, and a Current Affairs 
Committee. Id.
201. Hachigian, supra note 2.
202. See Tavares, supra note 145. 
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city diplomacy conducted by leading experts on this topic, “among cities 
studied across [] various projects, regardless of size, almost all cities have 
some form of governance structure in place to manage engagements with 
other national or international cities.”
203
Cities’ offices of international affairs are tasked with engaging in for-
eign diplomacy with not only their municipal counterparts abroad, but with 
national and regional authorities too. Cities in Europe, beginning in the mid 
1990s, have been especially active in setting up what have been referred to 
as “Offices of International Affairs” (“OIAs”).
204
As European cities became 
increasingly active in helping the UN to advance its Millennium Develop-
ment Goals and in the Fair Trade movement, many mayors throughout Eu-
rope saw the need to create specialized OIAs to handle the flow of interna-
tional engagements and work. Today, OIAs tend to be housed 
organizationally within the mayor’s office and their portfolios include a 
wide variety of tasks, including planning and preparing for inbound and 
outbound diplomatic delegations, maintaining ties with partner cities and 
international city networks, overseeing and monitoring the progress of in-
ternational development projects, and sponsoring and organizing cultural 
and national heritage day events, among many other efforts and projects.
205
In some cases, cities are codifying their international involvement in 
their governing municipal ordinances. When Mexico City decided to assert 
its autonomy by adopting its own “Constitution” in 2017, it devoted one of 
its crowd-sourced articles to solidifying the city’s commitment to promoting 
its presence in the world and among “the global system of cities and local 
government networks.”
206
E. Harnessing the Language of International Law
Cities are deploying the language of IL for two reasons and in two dif-
ferent ways. First, they are citing IL as a way to create their own independ-
ent platform in the international arena and to gain leverage within the state-
dominated world of international politics.
207
Second, they are using IL to 
challenge the actions or inaction of their national governments at the nation-
al level.
208
Both are attempts to act autonomously from their nation-states in 
203. Acuto et al., supra note 135, at 6. 
204. Fishbone, supra note 113, at 4. 
205. Id. at 4–5. 
206. See Mariana Flores, The First Constitution of Mexico City, METROPOLIS (Feb. 21, 
2017), https://www.metropolis.org/news/first-constitution-mexico-city; Gregory Scruggs, The 
People Power Behind Mexico City’s New Constitution, CITYLAB, (Feb. 3, 2017), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/02/the-people-power-behind-mexico-citys-new-
constitution/515637. 
207. ASSER INSTITUTE, Cities and International Law in the Urban Age (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.asser.nl/about-the-institute/asser-today/cities-and-international-law-in-the-urban-
age. 
208. See generally Moritz Baumgärtel & Barbara Oomen, Pulling Human Rights Back 
In? Local Authorities, International Law, and the Reception of Undocumented Migrants, 51 J.
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order to advance their own policy positions when those positions are at odds 
with those of their national counterparts.
209
And because IL transcends indi-
vidual states, it provides cities with a legal foothold to do so. Of course, na-
tion-states, as the legal and political superiors of their sub-national territo-
ries (whether under national or international law), have ultimate veto power 
over the policies and laws adopted by municipalities.
210
But this has not 
stopped cities from using IL to gain leverage, as well as the national and in-
ternational spotlight, for their own policy goals––especially when those 
goals conflict with their country’s national goals.
These attempts are especially apparent in recent years in the areas of in-
ternational environmental law and human rights law, particularly asylum 
and refugee law. “Sanctuary cities,” which stake their claim on the interna-
tional legal right of individuals to seek safe asylum in other countries, and 
“human rights cities,” which also situate their legitimacy in international 
human rights law, are attempts by cities to overcome the constraints of state 
sovereignty and to utilize IL in order to enact their own agendas when those 
agendas conflict with national policies or laws.
211
In the words of Barbara 
Oomen and Mortiz Baumgärtel, two scholars of human rights law in the 
context of cities, “local authorities invoke responsibilities derived from in-
ternational human rights law to ‘decouple’ their policies from those adopted 
nationally.”
212
Cities oftentimes do this in alliance with NGOs and other af-
fected civil society actors, who together use the power of advocacy, nega-
tive publicity, and shaming campaigns to compel states to change their for-
eign policy goals.
213
For example, in the wake of U.S. President George W. 
Bush’s decision to go to war in Iraq, cities, NGOs, and advocacy groups 
came together to denounce the decision, and these denunciations were often 
framed at least partly in the language of IL.
214
LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 172, 176 (2019). One example of this is cities’ use of 
international human rights law to challenge the migration policies of their national govern-
ments and to set up their own more inclusive and welcoming policies, such as through sanctu-
ary cities in the United States. Id.
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ing that cities and NGOs, working together, “have been holding governments to account in the 
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214. See GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, Opposition to the War and Occupation of Iraq,
https://www.globalpolicy.org/challenges-to-the-us-empire/opposition-to-the-war-and-
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This behavior, termed “municipal internationalism,” was also apparent 
when U.S. city councils issued resolutions calling for a nuclear weapons 
freeze, urging divestment from firms conducting business in South Africa, 
opposing the adoption of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, and 
demanding cuts in the Pentagon’s budget.
215
When President Trump announced in June 2017 that the United States 
was pulling out of the Paris Agreement,
216
the Mayors of Paris, France, and 
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania responded with an op-ed in the New York Times.
217
In it, they announced that “an unprecedented alliance is emerging” among 
the more than 7,400 cities worldwide that are committed to upholding the 
Paris Agreement’s goals within their own cities, irrespective of their coun-
try’s level of commitment.
218
They explained that cities committed to this 
alliance not only for their own citizens, but also for the citizens of “every 
other city in the world.”
219
While the cities’ efforts did not cause Trump to reverse his position, 
their editorial did put pressure on other U.S. states and cities to adopt simi-
lar standards and policies that aligned with, or in some cases were more am-
bitious than, international environmental law: Though they cannot officially 
become signatories, over 400 U.S. cities have pledged to adopt the Paris 
Climate Agreement into local law or implement it through local practices,
220
and the number of non-state commitments jumps to above 1,000 when busi-
nesses and federal U.S. states are added into the count.
221
Municipal activism is not only happening in the United States, but in 
cities around the world. The Dutch city of Utrecht, as just one example, of-
ten invokes the work of UN Special Rapporteurs and international and re-
gional laws in its efforts to shelter asylum seekers despite a national prohibi-
tion against doing so.
222
Barcelona, like Utrecht, has styled itself a “human 
215. Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 28.
216. Paris Agreement, Annex A, No. 54113 (Dec. 12, 2015), https://treaties.un.org
/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/54113/Part/I-54113-0800000280458f37.pdf. This is a 
pact between 195 states to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. 
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rights city.”
223
It has introduced a human rights policy, appointed a local 
human rights ombudsman, created a Human Rights Observatory and two 
municipal services tasked with protecting human rights, and adopted a local 
charter on human rights.
224
Amsterdam has similarly adopted a city-wide 
human rights agenda rooted in international human rights law,
225
often citing 
the latter in order to justify its local policies when those policies conflict 
with national-level ones.
226
Similarly, mayors throughout Italy and in Lon-
don have openly stood up to their national counterparts and refused to enact 
recent anti-immigration policies, justifying their refusal on the grounds that 
to do otherwise would violate the international rights of refugees and mi-
grants.
227
Cities, both large and small, are also codifying treaties, wholesale and 
in part, into local law.
228
Many mayors throughout the United States adopted 
the Paris Climate Agreement––or some version of it––into local legislation 
ed Apr. 12, 2020); HumanRightsUtrecht.nl (city of Utrecht’s human rights website) (in Dutch) 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
223. UCLG Comm. on Soc. Inclusion, Participatory Democracy and Hum. Rts., Build-
ing the ‘City of Rights’: The Human Rights Policy of Barcelona (1995), https://www.uclg-
cisdp.org/en/observatory/building-%E2%80%98city-rights%E2%80%99-human-rights-
policy-barcelona. 
224. Id. The policy implements human rights locally and aims to turn Barcelona into a 
“city of rights.” Both international human rights and the European Charter for the Safeguard-
ing of Human Rights in the City (“ECHRC”) provide the human rights language and frame-
work of the policy. Funding for the policy comes from the municipal budget. Although the 
objective of becoming a city of rights arguably concerns the entire local government, the main 
institution concerned with implementation is the Civil Rights Department (“RDC”) of the 
municipality, within which different bodies operate: (1) the Office for Non-Discrimination, 
which mainly processes complaints of discrimination through mediation; (2) the Office for 
Religious Affairs, which promotes the religious freedom of the city’s religious communities in 
their relationship with the local administration and population; (3) the Council for lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender people, which is an advisory body composed of NGOs, collec-
tives, and other informal groups concerned with LGBT issues (though, recently, a plan for the 
mainstreaming of LGBT rights has also been promoted by the RDC); and (4) the Human 
Rights Observatory, which checks the status of human rights in the city. In addition to the 
RDC, the Síndic(a) de Greuges de Barcelona (the city’s ombudsperson) performs audits on the 
local administration that, especially considering the independent status of this institution, pro-
vide a crucial support to the safeguarding of human rights at the city level.
225. CITY OF AMSTERDAM, Policy: Diversity, https://www.amsterdam.nl/en/policy
/policy-diversity (last visited Jan. 13, 2020) (discussing Amsterdam’s “human rights policy”). 
226. See Anna Plyushteva, The Right to the City and Struggles over Urban Citizenship: 
Exploring the Links, AMSTERDAM SOC. SCI., 2009, at 81–97.
227. Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5, at 608 (discussing London’s adoption of a 
municipal identification program for undocumented immigrants at part of their #Lon-
donIsOpen campaign); Chiara Giordano, Italian Mayors Rebel Against Salvini’s Laws Crack-
ing Down on Asylum Seekers, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/europe/italy-immigration-matteo-salvini-laws-asylum-seekers-mayors-
a8711051.html.
228. Two examples of cities adopting entire treaties into law are San Francisco and Los 
Angeles adopting the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women [CEDAW]. See infra notes 230–231.
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after President Trump announced his intention to withdraw from the agree-
ment. Before that, in 2005, nearly 150 cities––representing almost thirty 
million residents––signed on to the Kyoto Protocol after President Bush re-
fused to do so.
229
Similarly, the mayors of San Francisco (in 1998)
230
and, 
many years later, Los Angeles (in 2015)
231
adopted the UN Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women into munic-
ipal law, despite the United States’ ongoing refusal to ratify it at the national 
level.
232
In Europe, a variety of cities symbolically “ratified” the Internation-
al Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and codified parts 
of it into local law, long before many of their national governments fol-
lowed suit.
233
City networks also harness the language of IL in order to advance their 
own, separate goals. For example, Eurocities, a network of major European 
cities founded in 1986, issued a statement in 2015 on “Asylum in Cities” in 
the wake of an influx of refugees from parts of the Middle East into Eu-
rope.
234
In this statement, they cite refugees’ “right to seek international pro-
tection,” as codified under “European treaties and international law,” to 
support their efforts to provide safe haven to refugees through “Solidarity 
Cities.”
235
The European Coalition of Cities Against Racism, an internation-
al city network launched in 2004 that now includes over 120 municipalities 
from twenty-four different European countries, bases its advocacy and poli-
cy work on the international Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination.
236
Cities’ efforts to wield the language of international law appear to be 
paying off, or, at least, catching the ear of those in the international policy-
and law-making world. The UN Human Rights Council, for example, has 
noted that local governments have a shared responsibility and a mutually 
complementary role in the domestic implementation of international human 
rights norms and standards, and it has called for additional research on local 
229. Paul Brown, US Cities Snub Bush and Sign Up to Kyoto, GUARDIAN (May 16, 
2005), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2005/may/17/usnews.climatechange.
230. San Francisco, Cal., CEDAW Ordinance (1998). 
231. Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 175735 (Dec. 30, 2003) (providing for the local im-
plementation of CEDAW).
232. UN Hum. Rts. Off. of the High Comm’r, Status of Ratification Interactive Dash-
board, https://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Dec. 23, 2019)  (showing CEDAW ratification; 
the United States has not yet ratified CEDAW).
233. Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5, at 617.
234. EUROCITIES, Statement on Asylum in Cities (May 2015), http://nws.eurocities.eu/
MediaShell/media/EUROCITIES%20stmt_asylum_May%202015.pdf.
235. Id. at 1–2.
236. EUROPEAN COALITION OF CITIES AGAINST RACISM [ECCAR], General Infor-
mation, https://www.eccar.info/sites/default/files/document/ECCAR_basic%20information
%202_0.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2020); ECCAR, List of the Member Cities of ECCAR,
https://www.eccar.info/en/members (last visited Jan 13, 2020). ECCAR was not the inde-
pendent creation of cities but was launched instead by UNESCO; it is supported by the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights and UCLG. See ECCAR, General Information. 
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governments and human rights.
237
Similarly, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, whose office is responsible for refugees, invited cities to join the 
#WithRefugees campaign, thereby highlighting and strengthening the role 
of cities in protecting and housing refugees.
238
F. Adopting and Implementing “Global Law”
Cities and city networks are not just using the verbiage of IL; they are 
adopting joint statements, declarations, covenants, commitments, and action 
and policy plans that look and act strikingly similar to international legal 
agreements. Like other forms of “global law” these instruments are rooted 
in the consent of the signatory. And just like other global agreements, they 
are typically valid only with signature by officially authorized individuals 
(often mayors or top city officials, like those in the city’s OIA), an official 
deposit of the signed agreement with a specially designated agency or au-
thority (typically the agreement’s sponsor), and some form of monitoring 
and reporting, albeit often in the form of self-monitoring and self-reporting. 
As in much of public IL, which in many instances is enforced through 
shaming or pressure campaigns rather than typical enforcement measures,
239
the agreements typically lack robust enforcement mechanisms (such as 
sanctions in the event of a violation).
These law-like and legally influential documents are increasingly com-
mon and increasingly impactful. For example, the Global Covenant of 
Mayors for Climate and Energy is an international alliance of cities and lo-
cal governments with a shared long-term vision of promoting and support-
ing voluntary action to combat climate change.
240
In its efforts to mobilize 
cities and local governments to be active contributors to a global climate so-
lution, it encourages cities to make “strategic action plans” that are regis-
tered, implemented, made publicly available, and monitored by the Cove-
nant’s secretariat.241 Through its efforts, the Global Covenant of Mayors has 
received the commitment of over 9,000 cities and local governments from 
six continents and 127 countries, representing more than 770 million resi-
dents. The commitment process, which all “signatory cities” must under-
go,
242
in many ways mirrors the treaty-signing process performed by nation-
states. Cities or local governments wishing to formalize their commitment 
237. Rep. of the Advisory Comm. to the Hum. Rts. Council on Its Ninth Session, at 18, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/AC/9/6 (August 14, 2012); ECCAR, General Information, supra note 236. 
238. UNHCR, Cities #WithRefugees, https://www.unhcr.org/withrefugees/cities (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
239. Frederic Kirgis, Enforcing International Law, ASIL INSIGHTS, (Jan. 22, 1996),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1/issue/1/enforcing-international-law. 
240. THE GLOBAL COVENANT OF MAYORS FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY, About Us,
https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/about (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
241. Id. 
242. THE GLOBAL COVENANT OF MAYORS FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY, How to Join the
Global Covenant of Mayors, https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/participate (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2020).
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with the Global Covenant of Mayors must submit a commitment document 
signed by a government official according to their local governmental pro-
cedures.
243
Once submitted, cities are called on to “develop a greenhouse 
gas emissions inventory,” adopt a “full climate action plan,” define “ambi-
tious climate mitigation targets,” and regularly report on their progress.244
Similarly, C40 has crafted a number of “pacts” and “declarations” that 
its members can choose to accept a la carte. Once accepted, however, these 
agreements are treated as formal commitments and require regular reporting 
and monitoring. For example, C40’s Green and Healthy Street Declaration 
commits its signatories to procure only zero-emission buses by 2025 and to 
ensure that a major portion of their cities are entirely emission-free by 
2030.
245
Signatories must fill out a “planned action template” and submit it 
to the C40 Secretariat for formal recording.
246
The full list of committed cit-
ies and their specific action plans are then published online in an effort to 
hold them publicly accountable.
247
C40’s Advancing Towards Zero Waste 
Declaration is another example of a global law generated and overseen by a 
city network.
248
This declaration obligates cities and regions to cut the 
amount of waste generated by each of their citizens by 15% by 2030. Signa-
tory cities must “publicly report” on their progress every two years, submit 
a planned action template to C40’s secretariat, and agree to have their 
names published online in order to be held publicly accountable.
249
To date, 
twenty-eight cities and regions have signed on.
250
As hinted above, at times city networks join forces to create and im-
plement global laws. The One Planet Charter, for example, is a joint initia-
tive of C40, the Global Covenant of Mayors, and ICLEI that commits signa-
tory cities to enact specific climate action policies accelerating 
implementation of the Paris Agreement.
251
Commitments must be registered 
with the Global Covenant of Mayor’s Secretariat, a list of “committed cit-
ies” is made publicly available, and cities with particularly ambitious “city 
243. Id.
244. Id. 
245. C40 CITIES, Our Commitment to Green and Healthy Streets,
https://www.c40.org/other/fossil-fuel-free-streets-declaration (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
246. Id.
247. C40 CITIES, Green and Healthy Streets: Fossil-Fuel-Free Streets Declaration––
Planned Actions to Deliver Commitments, https://c40-production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/
other_uploads/images/1924_FFF_ACTION_010219.original.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
248. C40 CITIES, Advancing Toward Zero Waste Reduction,
https://www.c40.org/other/zero-waste-declaration (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. THE GLOBAL COVENANT OF MAYORS FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY, Join the One 
Planet Charter and Let’s Set Up Climate Action in 2018! (June 12, 2018), 
https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/press/join-one-planet-charter-lets-step-climate-
action-2018.
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climate actions” are featured on their website.
252
To date, over 800 cities 
have signed the charter.
253
In other cases, global laws are conceived of by individual mayors. The 
“Urban Food Policy Pact,” for example, was launched by the Mayor of Mi-
lan, Italy in February 2014 and signed by 100 cities. This pact “commits” 
signatories to build and establish food systems centered on sustainability 
and social justice. After the pact was signed by all 100 cities, it was deposit-
ed with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, following the same protocol 
as international treaty adoptions and ratifications.
254
Other global laws include the World Green Building Council’s Net Ze-
ro Carbon Building Commitment,
255
which obligates signatories to follow a 
five-stage process to ensure that all of their buildings, whether old or new, 
meet net-zero carbon standards by 2050, and the European Charter for Safe-
guarding Human Rights in the Cities, which has now been signed by over 
400 cities.
256
Moreover, many of the agreements and pacts previously men-
tioned throughout this article, such as the Nancy Declaration, the Mechelen 
Declaration, and the Shanghai Declaration, as well as others not here men-
tioned like the Climate Mayor’s Pledge, could also be included in this grow-
ing list. And finally, legal documents signed between international organiza-
tions and international city networks, such as the memorandum of 
understanding recently signed by the Global Parliament of Mayors 
(“GPM”)
257
and UN-Habitat to formalize the GPM’s implementation of the 
SDGs at the local level,
258
could also be placed in the growing body of legal-
like instruments being signed and implemented by mayors around the 
252. Id.
253. C40 CITIES, Scores of Cities Commit to Bold Climate Action to Deliver on the 
Highest Ambition of Paris Agreement, https://www.c40.org/press_releases/scores-of-cities-
commit-to-bold-climate-action-to-deliver-on-the-highest-ambition-of-paris-agreement (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
254. MILAN URBAN FOOD POLICY PACT, History, http://www.milanurbanfoodpolicy
pact.org/history (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
255. WORLD GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, The Net Zero Carbon Buildings Commitment,
https://www.worldgbc.org/thecommitment (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
256. Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 5, at 615. 
257. The Global Parliament of Mayors (“GPM”) is an international city network created 
in 2016 and conceived of by best-selling author and scholar Benjamin Barber in the final 
chapter of his book If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities. The 
GPM aims to represent and amplify the opinions of mayors and cities at the international law. 
BARBER, supra note 21. It has the goal of informing international policies on issues of local 
importance, such as migration, health, and security. GLOBAL PARLIAMENT OF MAYORS 
[GPM], UN Habitat and Mannheim Work Towards Accreditation of GPM,
https://globalparliamentofmayors.org/un-habitat-mannheim-work-towards-accreditation-gpm 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2020). I have served as the principal investigator for a joint project be-
tween the GPM and the Georgetown Law Center, and I continue to work with the GPM. 
258. GPM, UN Habitat and Mannheim Work Towards Accreditation of GPM, supra
note 257.
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world.
259
The GPM contributes to global policy discussions, in part, through 
its virtual voting platform, which allows participating mayors to vote on 
specific policy outcomes from wherever they might be in the world, which 
can then be delivered to policy-makers at the international level.
260
Accord-
ing to the GPM, this represents “an excellent example of adapting the inter-
national agenda through local action.”
261
In some cases, global laws involve a variety of non-state actors, includ-
ing private organizations and foundations in addition to international organ-
izations and cities. For example, in March 2016, mayors from around the 
world signed on to the New York Proposal for Inclusive Growth in Cities as 
a symbol of their commitment to address rising inequality.
262
By signing on 
to the proposal, all of the signatory mayors agreed to champion an “inclu-
sive growth agenda” in their cities, to share best practices, and to help shape 
a policy roadmap to achieve more inclusive growth in cities worldwide.
263
Of course, challenges arise with respect to these softer, non-binding 
forms of “law.” At root, all are voluntary and unenforceable, and therefore 
rely on the power of persuasion, reputation, and self-reporting. Moreover, 
verification is often difficult, and standards are often amorphous. For exam-
ple, in the “frequently asked questions” section of C40’s pledge “to deliver 
inclusive climate action that benefits all citizens equitably,” C40 concedes 
that “standardization of outcomes is unlikely to be possible” and that “inclu-
sive climate action” will be different in different cities and regions, making 
any formal way to track or report violations difficult at best.
264
Mayors are 
encouraged to define inclusivity in the way that is most suitable to their par-
ticular geographical, social and economic contexts. Yet, these agreements 
are still law, and legally influential and impactful. What is needed is a new 
vocabulary, a new conceptual framework, indeed a whole new way of con-
ceptualizing the changing role of cities within international politics. Our 
current terminology and our current framework are ill equipped to accurate-
ly and holistically understand the increasingly influential roles that cities are 
now playing both on the national and international political stages. A tenta-
tive attempt to offer a new vocabulary and conceptual lens to better under-
259. UNITED NATIONS, Goal 11: Make Cities Inclusive, Safe, Resilient and Sustainable,
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/cities (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
260. GPM, Virtual Platform, https://globalparliamentofmayors.org/virtual-platform (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
261. Id.
262. Angie Fyfe, The New York Proposal for Inclusive Growth in Cities, ICLEI (Mar. 
30, 2016) http://icleiusa.org/the-new-york-proposal-for-inclusive-growth-in-cities. The New 
York Proposal was a joint initiative of the OECD, the Ford Foundation, Brookings, Cities Al-
liance, C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, ICLEI, National League of Cities, UCLG, and 
United Way Worldwide. Id.
263. GPM, UN Habitat and Mannheim Work Towards Accreditation of GPM, supra
note 257.
264. C40 CITIES, Pledging to Deliver Inclusive Climate Action That Benefits All Citizens 
Equitably: FAQ, https://c40-production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/other_uploads/images/
1881_Pledging_to_deliver_ICA_FAQ_for_website.original.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
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stand the changing status of cities at the global level, which I hope that fu-
ture scholarship and researchers will deepen and build upon, is presented 
below.
IV.  The Urbanization of Global Relations and Global Law
Although the literature in this field is outdated and empirically and con-
ceptually wanting in certain respects, it nevertheless points to a reality: Cit-
ies’ influence, assertiveness, and ability to shape outcomes at the interna-
tional level (their “soft power”) has been escalating since shortly after the 
turn of the twenty-first century. This is true despite the fact that cities no 
longer have militaries or full sovereignty, and they do not harbor the tradi-
tional hard power tools embodied by states. Yet they do have power in some 
senses: the ability to exercise influence over others, and more specifically, 
the ability to get other actors to do something that they otherwise would not 
do.
265
Cities influence the actions of others––whether other cities or city 
networks, civil society organizations, international organizations, private 
businesses, or states––throughout the globe.
Cities’ power is reflected in their ability to attract people, money, and 
goods from around the globe. Cities might not have powerful weaponry, but 
they (at least global and mega-cities) have powerful brands, extraordinary 
wealth, incredible diversity, and the most cutting-edge innovations, infra-
structure, and technology. Moreover, they have the trust of their residents, 
the ability to mobilize collectively, and a democratic legitimacy often lack-
ing in nation-states.
266
They are operating globally, signing and implement-
ing things that look and act like international law, forming powerful partner-
ships, and influencing the actions and policy positions of other international 
actors, including nation-states.
Yet, if one were to examine black letter IL or an IR textbook, it would 
be easy to conclude that cities are entirely absent from the international po-
litical arena. While cities are taking on greater, more visible, and more in-
fluential roles in international affairs, they remain largely powerless under 
IL, which continues to prioritize states as the primary possessors of rights 
and duties. The little scholarship that exists on this topic––notably including 
the body of literature known as “international local government law”––
includes many insights and valuable contributions, but tries to pigeon hole 
cities into the constrained parameters and vocabulary of IL and IR, neither 
of which––and especially not IL––easily map onto cities and their changing 
status in international politics. By mixing up norms, laws, influence, persua-
sion, and coercion, this literature conflates two distinctions that, when crisp-
ly applied to cities, can more usefully describe their current position the in-
ternational arena. The first distinction, which receives scrutiny from IR 
265. This classic definition of “power” was formulated by renowned political scientist 
Robert Dahl. Robert Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 201–15 (1957). 
266. Florida, supra note 3. 
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scholars, is soft versus hard power.267 The second, which is studied by IL 
scholars, is soft versus hard law.268
A. Cities’ Rising Soft Power
Soft power is the ability to achieve objectives, oftentimes foreign policy 
objectives, through attraction and persuasion.
269
Put another way, it is the 
ability to influence the actions of others without force or coercion. In the 
current globalized and digitized era, where power is more diffuse and our 
common challenges are more interdependent, “victory often depends not on 
whose army wins, but on whose story wins.”
270
More and more actors, in-
cluding non-state actors, are asserting themselves in national and global pol-
itics, which are no longer the exclusive terrain of nation-states. Joseph Nye, 
who first coined the term “soft power” in 1990, applied this term, like most 
political scientists, only to states.
271
Yet, soft power is equally applicable to 
other non-state actors, including cities, and can help to explain their rising 
influence. Indeed, the things that Nye identifies as comprising a nation’s 
soft power––favorability toward foreign countries, foreigners, and tourists; 
higher education institutions, embassies, museums, and cultural organiza-
tions; technological and digital sophistication; access to creative industries 
and entertainment; and the ability to facilitate foreign exchanges, among 
others––are almost always found in local-level policies.
272
The same things 
that give nation-states increased soft power give cities increased soft power, 
and, in many instances these days, cities, rather than states, seem to be the 
leaders in acquiring and increasing this type of power.
One of the primary ways that cities have acquired and increased their 
soft power is by forming the city networks described above. When Blank 
wrote about the rise of “global associations of localities” in 2006, he could 
list only nine examples.
273
Today, well over 200 such networks exist and this 
number is continually rising, with an average of four new international city 
networks emerging every year.
274
Similarly, when Blank, Frug, and Barron 
wrote their articles on cities and IL in the early 2000s, examples of the ways 
in which cities were adopting and enforcing international norms and acting 
267. See generally JOSEPH NYE, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD 
POLITICS (2004).
268. See Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Gov-
ernance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000).
269. JONATHAN MCCLORY, THE SOFT POWER 30: A GLOBAL RANKING OF SOFT 
POWER 12 (2018), https://softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/The-Soft-Power-30-
Report-2018.pdf. 
270. Joseph Nye, The Information Revolution and Soft Power, 113 CURRENT HISTORY
19, 20 (2014) (citing John Arquilla).
271. See JOSEPH NYE, BOUND TO LEAD: THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN 
POWER (1990). 
272. MCCLORY, supra note 269, at 31–33.
273. Blank, supra note 26, at 922–23. 
274. Leffel & Acuto, supra note 113. 
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as independent global actors were admittedly “hard to pinpoint.”
275
But to-
day, nearly fifteen years later, this is no longer the case. Examples of the 
ways in which cities are helping to advance certain international norms and 
acting as autonomous global actors now abound.
B. Cities’ Use of Soft Law
Soft law describes those quasi-legal instruments that are neither strictly 
binding nor completely lacking in legal significance, such as declarations, 
guidelines, protocols, principles, policy declarations, codes of conduct, 
communications, and the like.
276
They are not enforceable in the traditional 
ways, but nevertheless have an impact and influence over state, or in this 
case, city, behavior.
277
UN General Assembly Resolutions are a classic ex-
ample of international soft law (as made by nation-states); they are legally 
significant and can and often do influence state behavior, but they are not 
legally binding or enforceable in a court of law.
278
In contrast, hard law, in 
the international context, includes binding legal agreements, with the classic 
example being an international treaty, the primary source of IL.
279
Hard law creates responsibilities and rights that are legally enforceable 
by authorized courts or tribunals, backed by a police or military force, and 
that impose real consequences (typically including fines, imprisonment, or 
obligatory corrective action).
280
Soft law, on the other hand, creates non-
enforceable standards and norms and relies on the force of persuasion, repu-
tation, and cooption (the same mechanisms through which soft power is ex-
ercised) to induce voluntary compliance.
281
Though soft law is often thought 
to be “vague,” “uncompelling,” and “weak,” the powerful fact remains: It is 
often followed.
282
According to a leading IL textbook, “states do in fact re-
spect and rely on ‘soft law’ norms,” just as they comply with many hard law
norms even when they know that enforcement is extremely unlikely.
283
In 
many cases, and especially at the international level, soft law norms trans-
form or crystallize into hard law; this is how much of customary interna-
tional law is formed. Much of international environmental law, for example, 
275. Blank, supra note 26, at 925. 
276. Gregory Shaffer & Mark Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, 
and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010).
277. Bryan Druzin, Why Does Soft Law Have Any Power Anyway?, 7 ASIAN J. INT’L L.
361 (2017).
278. Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on 
Customary International Law, 73 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 301 (1979).
279. For the definition of a “treaty,” see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
280. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 276, at 724.
281. Druzin, supra note 276, at 366–70.
282. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L
L. 413, 414 (1983).
283. PUGH ET AL., supra note 35, at 34.
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started out as ‘soft law’ norms, but, as time went on, global actors decided 
to embody those norms in formal international treaties, such as the Paris 
Climate Agreement.
284
The hard versus soft law dichotomy,
285
when combined with the hard 
versus soft law distinction, can help to explain the rise of cities internation-
ally in recent years despite their ongoing powerlessness from a formal inter-
national legal and political perspective. Hard and soft power are disconnect-
ed; one can exist without the other. For example, while North Korea’s hard 
power is high, it is lacking entirely in soft power, or the ability to change 
other states’ behavior through attraction to its values or policy objectives. 
Similarly, while America has traditionally been strong on both soft and hard 
power, some (including Joseph Nye himself) argue that in the Trump era, its 
soft power has plummeted.
286
While cities remain powerless from a hard 
power and hard law perspective, they have increasingly high levels of soft 
power, which they are using, in part, to adopt soft law instruments.
And having one increases the other. As cities’ soft power rises, the 
number of soft law instruments they wield also rises. Cities’ rising soft 
power and increasing use of soft law are demonstrated by their formidable 
role in a variety of multilateral agendas, events, committees and taskforces–
–including the UN’s New Urban Agenda;
287
the two Earth Summits in 1992 
and 2002;
288
the UN Habitat conference in 1996 and every subsequent Habi-
tat conference since; the annual Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migra-
tion, and Development;
289
the World Assembly of Local and Regional Gov-
ernments;
290
the Cities #WithRefugees Campaign;
291





the UN Global Taskforce on 
284. Id. 
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Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 167, 168–81 (1996) (advocating against retention of the “tradi-
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Their rising soft 
power is also reflected in the multitude of legal-like agreements signed be-
tween cities and international organizations, or among globally dispersed 
cities themselves; examples include the Climate Energy Declaration;
296
the 
Mechelen Declaration on Cities and Migration;
297
the Aberdeen Agenda 
Principles on Good Practice for Local Democracy and Good Governance;
298
the Global Compact on Refugees;
299
Goal 11 of the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals;
300
and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.
301
C. Updating Core IL and IR Terminology
The international arena is no longer the exclusive playground of nation-
states, but instead is a crowded arena buzzing with a variety of non-state ac-
tors, some of which are governmental, some of which are private, and some 
of which defy both those categories. This arena can no longer accurately be 
characterized as “international,” or as governed by “international” law and 
the rules of “international” relations. The broader and more inclusive term 
global is much more accurate and appropriate. According to Janne Nijman, 
“we are facing a moment of foreign policy transformation: We are shifting 
from an international to a global society and in this process the city is rising 
as a key foreign policy actor.”
302
Global society, global governance, global 
relations, global law, global actors, global cities: These are the terms that 
make up the terminology of the twenty-first century. To remain aligned with 
cisdp.org/en/activities/human-rights-cities/international-meetings/World-Human-Rights-
Cities-Forum-of-Gwangju (last visited Apr. 25, 2020). 
293. Local Agenda 21 is a global environmental and development program adopted by 
the UN Conference on the Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. See
UN Conf. on Env’t and Dev., Agenda 21, supra note 159.
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https://climateemergencydeclaration.org/climate-emergency-declarations-cover-15-million-
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WIRED (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/cities-climate-change-equity-paris-
agreement. 
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298. COMMONWEALTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FORUM, What We Do: The Aberdeen 
Agenda (last visited Apr. 25, 2020), https://www.clgf.org.uk/what-we-do/aberdeen-agenda.
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300. Supra text accompanying notes 123, 144, and 259.
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Risk Reduction 2015–2030, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.224/L.2 (Mar. 18, 2015).
302. Janne Nijman, Renaissance of the City as Global Actor: The Role of Foreign Policy 
and International Law Practices in the Construction of Cities as Global Actors, in THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICY: DRAWING AND MANAGING BOUNDARIES FROM 
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empirical realities, international lawyers and scholars of IR should start in-
corporating these terms into their vocabulary. Failure to do so will result in 
confusing conclusions like Frug and Barron’s statement that cities’ role in 
international politics is best characterized as a “combination of simultane-
ous empowerment and disempowerment.”
303
This struggle with language is reflected in the emerging literature on 
city diplomacy as well, which refers to cities’ involvement in global politics 
as “Municipal Internationalism,” “Paradiplomacy,” the “International Mu-





The emerging body of literature, which includes the current article, on 
city diplomacy fills in the gaps and provides the necessary updates where 
the “international local government law” literature leaves off. However, 
while interdisciplinary, analytically rigorous, and empirically rich, this new-
er body of research is largely not led by legal scholars, and it does not in-
clude any legal analysis. Instead, it falls at the intersection of urban planning 
and IR, neither of which tend to prioritize (and both of which often down-
play or ignore), the legal dimensions of recent global urbanization trends. 
As such, while the city diplomacy literature lacks the legal analysis and in-
sights characteristic of the earlier international local government law litera-
ture, the latter lacks the more up-to-date and empirically rigorous nature of 
the former. Together, however, these two bodies of literature––especially 
when combined with the legal literature on soft law and the political science 
literature on soft power,––present a much fuller and more robust portrayal 
of the status of cities in global governance today.
I call the nexus of these two fields “the urbanization of global rela-
tions.” Building on the various bodies of applicable research that exist on 
cities, I propose a research agenda for this new field that encompasses the 
literature on global governance, city diplomacy, and city networking; inter-
national local government law; IL scholarship on soft versus hard law; and 
IR scholarship on soft versus hard power. To more fully develop this re-
search agenda, the collective and interdisciplinary efforts of international 
lawyers, as well as scholars of IR, IL, and cities, will all be necessary. Only 
by reaching across our departmental aisles, interbreeding our ideas, and 
working collaboratively together can we fully understand the complex geo-
legal-political landscape that now defines international governance.
Under our current conceptual framework––a world order built on the 
idea that nation-states are the sole international actors that matter, and that 
303. Frug & Barron, supra note 16, at 52, 61. 
304. Muqtedar Khan, Rethinking Collective Identity Through the Lenses of Al Farabi, 
Ibn Khaldun, DAILY SABAH (May 1, 2019) https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2019/05/01/
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is a revolution in progress that is shifting responsibility for governance and sovereignty away 
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305. Some of these labels originated in the Frug and Barron article from 2006, including 
“municipal foreign policy” and “the municipal foreign policy movement.” Frug & Barron, 
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hard power and hard law are the primary determinants of international in-
fluence––cities appear formally powerless. Yet, when new concepts are em-
braced and new terminology employed, the status of cities looks entirely 
different.
Cities embody increased levels of soft power, which they’ve acquired in 
part by increasing their arsenal of soft law tools. They are forming into 
powerful large-scale networks, allying with well-connected international or-
ganizations, gaining seats on UN decision-making bodies, successfully lob-
bying for inclusion in multilateral agendas, mirroring state-based coalitions 
and events, and adopting their own body of global laws, which they use to 
hold each other accountable. They are participating in global, not interna-
tional, politics, alongside an array of other non-state actors, and their voices, 
opinions, and needs are being heard. It is time to break out of the “concep-
tual jail” that IL and IR have imprisoned cities within, and to see global (not 
international) politics for what it is: a fuzzy and complex domain of states 
and non-state actors cooperating and competing together to shape global 




Cities are central to all current and projected global challenges and their 
centrality translates into increased assertiveness and influence at the global 
level.
307
Today, cities––not nation-states––are where the global wealth, 
global population, global trade, global innovations, and our great global 
threats can all be found; they produce over 80% of global GDP, release 75% 
of planet-warming emissions, and house 54% of the human population (and 
rising).
308
An increasing number of cities, like Tokyo and London, now 
boast economies larger than many G-20 countries.
309
New York City’s GDP 
is larger than that of Spain or South Korea; Sao Paulo is wealthier than Ar-
gentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia combined; and Guangdong in Chi-
306. ROSENAU, supra note 45, at 15–17; see, e.g., Chan, supra note 1, at 138. 
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and Up, IPE REAL ASSETS (May/June 2019), https://realassets.ipe.com/residential/global-
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na is richer than either Russia or Mexico.
310
Despite occupying less than 3% 
of the earth’s surface, the majority (and soon the vast majority) of the 
world’s population, including nearly all refugees and migrants, reside in the 
world’s geographically miniscule urban areas. By 2050, nearly 70% of all 
people will live in cities,
311
and by 2030 there will be over forty mega-
cities.
312
Given these startling statistics, it is no wonder that some are refer-
ring to the current era as the “age of urbanization,”
313
the “century of cit-
ies,”
314
and the “urban millennium.”
315
A “Localist Revolution,” as it’s also 
been described, is indeed underway, and this revolution is metamorphosing 
our global institutions of governance and law in unprecedented new ways. 
Consequently, we need a new way of thinking and talking about our global–
–no longer international––relations.
316
As legal scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter declared nearly fifteen years 
ago, and as iconic city scholar Benjamin Barber confirmed more recently,
317
a “new world order,” is emerging in which non-state actors, including sub-
national actors, are taking on more influential and assertive roles on the 
world stage.
318
The nation-state, according to Slaughter, Barber, and now 
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others, has begun to disaggregate into sub-component parts, which are now 
rising up, pushing ahead, and in many cases, leaping over the world’s his-
toric Leviathans, to join forces with other non-state actors and stake out 
their own policy positions at the global level.
319
Among these new actors are 
local governments, the so-called “invisible gorillas of international stud-
ies,”
320
which play an “essential role in developing and implementing ac-
tions and driving ambition,”
321
and where, according to certain international 
experts, the “future of humanity” lies.
322
Some have even gone so far as to 
claim that cities are taking the lead and even supplanting national govern-
ments when it comes to solving our critical twenty-first century global chal-
lenges.
323
That claim that has increased resonance in an era when states 
seem increasingly incapable of reaching an agreement on some of our most 
basic and glaring challenges, such as climate change. As former Mayor and 
Chair of the C40, Michael Bloomberg, famously tweeted in 2013, “while 
nations talk, cities act.”
324
Even the UN itself, the primary international or-
ganization overseeing global governance, conceded shortly after the turn of 
the twenty-first century that “humanity’s future is decidedly urban.”
325
While we tend to focus on globalization and digitization as the key trends of 
the twenty-first century, those trends are primarily realized through the 
overarching trend of our times: urbanization.
New concepts, paradigms, and conceptual frameworks are needed to 
understand this new reality. Old terms, such as international relations, inter-
national law, international organizations, which carry the word “nation” 
within them are starting to sound out-of-touch and anachronistic in an era 
when global governance involves a multitude of actors involved in a variety 
of activities traditionally performed only by states. The concepts of soft law, 
soft power, global law, and global relations, while just a start, will put us on 
the path of better understanding how cities can remain both formally power-
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less under the current international legal regime, yet informally influential, 
and increasingly so, in a global political arena defined by a diffusion of ac-
tors and power.
326
Cities, through their use of soft law instruments, savvy 
strategies, and influential alliances, are acquiring more and more soft power 
in the global sphere, allowing them to contribute not only to the implemen-
tation and enforcement of global agendas and IL, but also to contribute to 
their very formation.
326. Swiney & Foster, Cities Are Rising in Influence and Power on the Global Stage,
supra note 2. 
